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1. THE 1ST WORLD CONGRESS ON LOGIC AND 
RELIGION 
1.1. Aim of the 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion 
Although logic, symbol of rationality, may appear as opposed to religion, 
both have a long history of cooperation. Philosophical theology, ranging 
from Anselm to Gödel, has provided many famous proofs for the existence 
of God. On the other side, many atheologians, such as Hume, for example, 
have developed powerful arguments meant to disproof God’s existence. 
These arguments have been scrutinized and developed in many interesting 
ways by twentieth century analytic philosophy of religion. Moreover, in the 
Bible the logos is assimilated to God, which has been reflected in western 
philosophy in different ways by philosophers such as Leibniz and Hegel. 
Other religions, such as Buddhism, Islam and many hindu orthodox schools 
such as Nyaya and Vedanta are strongly connected to reasoning. Despite of 
this, it seems that as an academic research field the area of logic and 
religion has still to be consolidated. The aim of the 1
st
 World Congress on 
Logic and Religion is to fill in his gap, providing a place where logicians 
from all fields, as well as theologians from all religions, can get together to 
hear from each other on the late developments of the relations between 
logic and religion.  
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1.2. Call for Papers 
This will be the first world congress on logic and religion. Relations 
between logic in all its dimensions – philosophical, mathematical, 
computational and linguistic – and the different religions will be examined. 
To submit a contribution send a one page abstract to: 
logicandreligion@gmail.com. All talks dealing with the relation between 
logic and religion are welcome, in particular those falling into the 
categories below. Peer-reviewed papers will be published after the congress 
in a book and/or a special issue of a journal with publishers of international 
recognition. 
 
Logic and the Main Religions 
 buddhism 
 christianism 
 talmudism 
 islamism 
 taoism 
 zoroastrianism 
 hinduism 
 jainism 
 
Arguments for or against God's Existence 
 ontological arguments (Anselm, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, etc) 
 cosmological arguments 
 teleological and design arguments 
 arguments from religious experiences 
 arguments from evil 
 foreknowledge and free-will 
 divine hiddenness 
 Gödel's proof and other formal proofs 
 
Logic and Belief 
 doxastic logic 
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 belief and truth 
 belief and knowledge 
 possible worlds 
 agnosticism 
 skepticism 
 atheism 
 epistemic paradoxes 
 
Logic and the Concept of God 
 perfection, eternity, infinity 
 holiness 
 omnipotence, omniscience 
 goodness 
 pantheism 
 compossibility of divine attributes 
 
Scientific Conceptualization And Religion 
 evolution and creation 
 life and death 
 chance, causality, determinism 
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1.3. Organizers 
1.3.1 Organizing Committee 
 Ricardo Silvestre (Co-Chair), Federal University of Campina 
Grande, Brazil 
 Jean-Yves Béziau (Co-Chair), Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil 
 Giovanni da Silva de Queiroz, Federal University of Paraíba, Brazil 
 Cândida Jaci de Sousa Melo, Federal University of Paraíba, Brazil 
 Maria Lewtchuk Espindola, Federal University of Paraíba, Brazil 
 Itala D'Ottaviano, UNICAMP, Brazil 
 Daniel Durante, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil 
 Tâmara Mirely Silveira, State University of Paraíba, Brazil 
 Frank Sautter, Federal University of Santa Maria, Brazil 
 Ísis Andrade, Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil 
 Thiago Almeida, Federal University of Campina Grande, Brazil 
 
1.3.2 Scientific Committee 
 Fabio Bertato, UNICAMP, Campinas, Brazil 
 Frode Bjørdal, UFRN, Brazil and University of Oslo, Norway 
 Walter Carnielli, UNICAMP, Campinas, Brazil 
 Jonardon Ganeri, New York University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab 
Emirates 
 Brendan Gillon, McGill University, Canada 
 Laurent Lafforgue, IHÉS, Bures-sur-Yvette, France 
 Philip Larrey, Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican 
 Dilip Loundo, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil 
 Fabien Schang, Moscow State University, Russia 
 Eleonore Stump, Saint Louis University, USA 
 Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal, University of Brasília, Brazil 
 Flavio Augusto Senra Ribeiro, Pontifical Catholic University of 
Minas Gerais, Brazil 
 Rob van der Sandt, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
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 Anand Jayprakash Vaidya, San José State University, USA 
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1.4. Realization  
The 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion is realized by Federal 
University of Campina Grande, Federal University of Paraíba, Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro and the Brazilian Academy of Philosophy. 
1.5. Sponsors 
The event is sponsored by the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher 
Education Personnel (CAPES), the Brazilian National Council for 
Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), the State Government 
of Paraíba, the Formation and Education Institute (IFE), Campinas, and the 
Graduate Program in Philosophy of the Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro (UFRJ). 
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2. ABSTRACTS 
2.1. Keynote Talks 
 
BENEDIKT PAUL GÖCKE 
 
DID GOD KNOW IT? GOD'S RELATION TO A WORLD 
OF CHANCE AND RANDOMNESS 
 
Ian Ramsey Centre for Science and Religion, University of Oxford, UK 
benedikt.goecke@gmail.com 
 
A common type of argument against the existence of God is to argue that 
certain essential features associated with the existence of God are 
inconsistent with certain other features to be found in the actual world. A 
recent example of this type of argument against the existence of God is 
based on the assumption that there are random processes or chancy states of 
affairs in the actual world that contradict that God is the absolute sovereign 
over his creation: Chancy states of affairs are said to entail a denial of 
divine providence or omniscience. However, more often than not this 
apparent conflict is formulated only intuitively and lacks sufficient 
conceptual clarification of the crucial terms involved. As a consequence, it 
is seldom clear where the conflict really lies. In what follows, I firstly 
provide a brief analysis of chance and randomness before I turn to 
cosmological and evolutionary arguments against the existence of God that 
in some way or other are based on chance and randomness. I end by way of 
comparing three popular conceptions of God as regards their ability to deal 
with God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness. Neither classical 
theism, nor open theism, nor indeed process panentheism has difficulties to 
account for God’s relation to a world of chance and randomness. 
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CHRISTOPH BENZMÜLLER 
 
GÖDEL'S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT REVISITED 
Findings from a Computer-Supported Analysis 
 
Freie Universität Berlin, Germany 
c.benzmueller@googlemail.com 
 
Gödel’s ontological argument has been analysed for the first-time with an 
unprecedent degree of detail and formality with the help of higher-order 
automated theorem provers. From Gödel's premises, the computer proved: 
necessarily, there exists God. On the other hand, the theorem provers have 
also confirmed prominent criticism on Gödel's ontological argument, and 
they found some new results about it. 
In this talk I will present and discuss the main findings of our 
ongoing computer-supported analysis of variants of Gödel's ontological 
argument. The background theory of the presented work offers a novel 
perspective towards a computational metaphysics. 
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DANIEL VANDERVEKEN 
 
ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC, PRINCIPIA ETHICA AND 
THE DEONTIC LOGIC INTRINSIC TO ANY RELIGION 
 
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Canada 
daniel.vanderveken@gmail.com 
 
Illocutionary logic contains a new logic of action, attitudes and directives 
which can interpret sentences of any type (declarative or not) and formalize 
the principles of practical as well as theoretical valid inferences. Any 
religion deals with what is good and bad. Any assertion that it is good (or 
bad) to carry out an action commits the speaker to giving the directive 
“Carry out (or do not carry out) that action!” Thanks to illocutionary logic 
one can formulate a new and more adequate deontic logic stating the 
universal ethical principles intrinsic to any religion. I will formulate and 
explain this new deontic logic and show that it eliminates well known 
paradoxes. 
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DANIEL VON WACHTER 
 
IS THERE ROOM FOR MIRACLES IN THE CAUSAL 
ORDER OF THE WORLD? 
 
Internationale Akademie für Philosophie im Fürstentum, Liechtenstein 
dvwachter@iap.li 
 
In 1655 Thomas Hobbes published the claim that all events are determined 
by preceding events. He held that this claim, determinism, is true a priori, 
as a matter of logic. Similarly, Immanuel Kant claimed that his principle of 
causality is true a priori. In the 19th century many theologians came to 
believe in determinism and therefore rejected the existence of divine 
interventions. In this talk, I shall argue that the a priori reasoning behind 
determinism is mistaken and also that Newton‘s laws do not entail 
determinism. We need to abandon entirely the Hobbesian-Humean view of 
the causal structure of the world. It turns out that there is no problem of 
whether there is room for miracles, even if, as quantum mechanics 
suggests, the laws of nature are not probabilistic. 
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GIANFRANCO BASTI 
 
A FORMALIZATION OF AQUINAS THEORY OF 
CREATION AS PARTICIPATION OF BEING 
 
Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican City 
basti@pul.it 
 
The formal philosophy is a fundamental means, in our globalization age, 
for an effective intercultural and interdisciplinary dialogue among 
religions, on one side, and between humanistic  and scientific disciplines, 
on the other one. In this framework we present here for the first time a 
complete formalization of Aquinas metaphysical theory of the 
“participation of being” in terms of the formal ontology of the natural 
realism (NR). The modal logic (ML) of this ontology is the KD45 system, 
formalized in terms of the category theory duality between Universal 
Algebra and Universal Coalgebra, recently developed in ML, and in 
theoretical computer science. In such a way, we can formally justify the 
logical completeness of the infinite sequences of nested Kripke models, and 
the consequent theory of stratified rigidity, constituting the double core of 
the NR formal ontology.  Therefore we can justify also the theory of the 
metaphysical biconditional (“if and only if”) in terms of the duality 
(homomorphism) between the logical (direct) and the ontological 
(converse) implication – without confusing the ontological use of the 
propositions posed in biconditional relationship (for denoting a causal 
relation between their referents), with their logical mention (logical 
equivalence). From the epistemological standpoint, such a duality 
formalizes Aquinas distinction between the “logical truth” (algebra) for 
finite intellects like ours, and the “ontological truth” (coalgebra) for an 
Infinite Intellect such as the Divine One. Finally, from the metaphysical 
standpoint, such a duality formalizes Aquinas theory of the double 
(essence-existence) constitution of all beings (apart from the Divine One), 
as the effect of the double physical (algebra) and metaphysical (coalgebra) 
causality. Effectively, in the context of UA/UC duality, the quantum field 
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theory (QFT) formalism, developed during the last twenty years in 
fundamental physics, can find its proper universal framework of 
ontological interpretation. It characterizes indeed each physical system with 
its thermal bath (i.e., the irreducible openness of each quantum system to 
the quantum vacuum fluctuations), in terms of the duality between a q-
deformed Hopf subalgebra/subcoalgebra, so to make the QFT a quantum 
thermal field theory. 
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JEAN-MICHEL KANTOR 
 
GOD AND INFINITY 
 
Institut mathématique de Jussieu (IMJ-PRG), France 
kantorjeanm@gmail.com 
 
From the beginning “Purely mathematical inquiry in itself, by its special 
character, its certainty and stringency, lifts the human mind into closer 
proximity with the divine… The religious intuition of the infinite, the 
apeiron, took hold of the greek soul” (Weyl,1932). Modern mathematics 
has been strongly influenced by philosophical and even religious attitudes 
concerning the new objects it was constructing. This has been the case with 
Georg Cantor’s theory of sets, where potential and actual infinities were 
given a status relying on Spinoza’s beliefs. We will examin a second 
example, thourougly documented in (Graham-Kantor, 2009), in which the 
sect of Nameworshippers pushed forward the new descriptive set theory. 
And finally we will consider the recent developments in logic of the axioms 
of large cardinals the object of an intense current working program but also 
of philosophical and theological discussions (Heller-Woodin, 2011). 
 
REFERENCES 
 
GRAHAM L., KANTOR J.-M, 2009, Naming Infinity: A True Story of 
Religious Mysticism and mathematical Creativity, Harvard University 
Press 
HELLER M. WOODIN H.,Eds. 2011,Infinity New Research Frontiers, 
Cambridge University Press.  
WEYL H.1932 god and the Universe: The Open world (New Haven; Yale 
University Press) 
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JEAN-PIERRE DESCLÉS 
 
LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ANSELM’S UNUM 
ARGUMENTUM (FROM PROSLOGION) 
 
STIH, University of Sorbonne, France 
Jean-Pierre.descles@paris-sorbonne.fr 
 
Anselm of Cantorbery (Saint Anselme de Cantorbery, 1982) wrote 
Proslogion (1077-1078) where is formulated the famous ‘Unum 
argumentum’ about the existence of God. Proslogion is viewed as a dialog 
between Anselm and an Insipiens (an unbeliever), the participants having 
in common the rationality (ratio) (Cattin, 1986; Corbin, 1985). The ‘Unum 
argumentum’ was been criticized by numerous logicians from an 
extensional view point. Indeed, classical predicate logic is not able to give 
an adequate analysis of this argument. Contrary to different commentaries, 
we think that the Anselm’s argument is not an ontological proof of the 
existence of God. According to us, this argument starts with an analysis of 
the meaning of a name of God : “Id quo nihil maius cogitari posit”; this 
name is not an analysis of the essence of God; it is the error of Gaunilon, a 
contemporary opponent to Anselm, and also of different critics after him. 
The argument is leaded by a deep linguistic understanding of the complex 
name expressed by “Id quo nihil maius cogitari posit” (something such as 
there is nothing that is taller than we can think). Anselm analyzes the 
meaning of this name; having characterized the associated complex 
concept, he deduces the logical consequences. The argument proves the 
propositions “quod non posit cogitare non esse” and “Deus non potest non 
cogitari non esse” by using a reasoning by absurd: if the Insipiens, who 
asserts “Deus non est”, understands in intellectu the meaning of “quo nihil 
maius cogitari posit”, then he is reaching toward a contradiction. In his 
proof, Anselm uses the following hypothesis: to think in re “is taller than” 
to think in solo intellectu. Combinatory Logic (Curry and Feys, 1958) is an 
abstract applicative formalism of operators applied to operands, where 
predicates, viewed as specific operators, can be composed and can be 
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transformed, in intrinsic ways, by means of abstract operators, called 
“combinators”, studied by Combinatory Logic. So, this formal framework 
is fully adequate to discuss the differences between the meanings of the 
elementary predicates ‘to be in re’, ‘to be in intellectu ’ and ‘to be in solo 
intellectu’ used in the Anselm’s argument (Desclés, 1991). We recall 
briefly the formalism of Combinatory Logic; we show how this formalism 
can be used to represent the meanings of complex predicates extracted from 
the Unum argumentum in order that we can explain how the argument runs.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
CATTIN, Y. 1986. La preuve de Dieu. Introduction à la lecture du 
Proslogion de Anselme de Canterbery. Paris : Vrin. 
CORBIN, M. 1985. “Essai sur la signification de l’unum argumentum du 
Proslogion”. Revue de l’Institut Catholique de Paris 16 : 25-49. 
CURRY H. and FEYS R. 1958. Combinatory Logic. North Holland 
DESCLES J.P. 1991. “ La double négation dans l’Unum Argumentum. 
Analyse à l’aide de la logique combinatoire”, Travaux du Centre de 
Recherches Sémiologiques, 59, Université de Neuchâtel : 33-74. 
SAINT ANSELME DE CANTORBERY. 1982. Fidens quaerens 
intellectum, id est Proslogion liber Gaunilionis pro insipinte arquer 
liber apologeticus contra gaunilonem. Texte et traduction par 
Alexanbdre Koyre. Paris: Vrin.  
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MARIE-HÉLÈNE GORISSE 
 
LOGIC AND THE RATIONAL LEGITIMIZATION OF RELIGIOUS 
CLAIMS IN JAINISM  
The Case-Study Of Guṇaratna’s Refutation of Hindu Theses 
 
Faculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte, Belgium 
mhgorisse@gmail.com 
 
Philosophical debates in Ancient India constitute a particularly rich field 
for studying the links between logic and religion. First because in the 
Indian framework, philosophical investigation is essentially linked with 
religious corpus and community. Second because, since it is granted that it 
is possible to define the standards of an ideally organized rational 
discussion the outcomes of which necessary are true statements, 
philosophical investigation is embedded within an argumentative frame 
assigning to logic a pervasive role. From this, there should be no real 
tension between faith and reason in the Indian framework. 
So how are Indian philosophers to account that there are religious 
decisions that are not open to change on the basis of rational considerations 
because they represent a deeper level of commitment? Indeed, different 
schools don’t reach the same conclusions in debates, since they differ on 
the logical rules and the ontology they are granting. This is where Jainism 
enter the picture, the Jaina touch being to overcome this by offering a 
pluralist logical framework able to absorb as well ontological differences. 
This talk based on the study of a debate on the existence of God, is aiming 
first at showing how one is confronted to non-revisable theses in concrete 
argumentative situations, and second at suggesting a Jain way to escape bad 
consequences of these situations. 
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MIRAY YAZGAN 
 
THE ROLE OF LOGIC IN JAINISM 
 
Istanbul University, Turkey 
miray.yazgan@gmail.com 
 
Having a different language and culture, India is one of the oldest and most 
important civilizations in the world. While it has a distinguished cultural 
background with its rich religions or recognizably mystical elements, 
within the boundaries of the vision of the universe, the thought systems that 
emerged in this culture and had a significant role in shaping it and the 
mentality that manifests through these systems are directly related to 
philosophy and logic. In fact, the studies offered by these thought systems 
shaping this culture and thinkers in the system distinctively reveal this 
phenomenon.  
Today, when we talk about Indian philosophy and Indian Logic, we 
must emphasize that we do not directly refer to a western type of 
philosophical mentality or (ancient or modern) logic practice. In fact, 
religious-mystical elements in the Indian mentality, just as in the Islamic 
world, are not tangibly isolated from the mentality that can be evaluated as 
philosophical.   Therefore, the studies on this subject must also consider 
this matter very carefully. This is important both for grasping the mentality 
in question as a whole and for grasping every individual mystical, 
philosophical and logical elements (components) in it.  
Undoubtedly, such studies describing cultures and ideologies of 
different cultures are crucially important for revealing the cultural 
interactions between the civilizations. The present study aims to investigate 
Jainism, which is an important figure in Indian world of thinking in terms 
of both religious (mystical/faith) and philosophical (metaphysics, ontology, 
epistemology) as well as logical elements.  
Jainism is a holistic faith and thinking system in terms of 
metaphysics, ontology, epistemology and logic (and also even language). 
The fundamental maxim of Jainism "do not live to know; but know how to 
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live ". By following this maxim Jainas, by considering their metaphysical, 
ontological, epistemological and logical viewpoints, they have put forward 
their vision of the universe. Their ontic views --supported by their 
epistemology and metaphysical views-- a product of their faith dwell on a 
logical base built accordingly. Jainas have developed a very elegant 
argument and substantiation (proof) method to defend their unbending and 
secluded teaching from outside criticism. The most perfect example of this 
is Syadvada & Sabthabhanginaya, which is a kind of theory of relativity in 
logic. 
Our study will address this logic model and its fundamental 
concepts in terms of their relationship with ontological, epistemological 
concepts, and primarily metaphysics in the Jainist thinkers' vision of the 
universe. Thus, we will discuss the role and importance of logic in Jainism.  
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MUSA AKRAMI 
 
LOGIC IN ISLAM AND MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC WORLD 
 
Department of Philosophy of Science, Islamic Azad University, Iran 
musa.akrami@srbiau.ac.ir 
 
In relation to Islam one may speak of 
1. logic in religious texts (from doctrinal texts such as Qur’an and sayings 
of the Prophet and Imams to the texts related to the principles and 
fundamentals of jurisprudence on the one hand and the texts of exegesis on 
the other hand), all of which make use of reasoning to persuade the 
audiences or to infer the rules and prescripts for religious behavior of the 
members of religious community; and  
2. logic as a discipline that is studied and applied both independently and as 
a tool for reasoning in schools of theology (from Ash’arites to Mu’tazilites 
and Shi’ites), systems of philosophy (from Peripatetics to Illuminationists), 
and other types of knowledge in medieval Islamic, all being strongly 
influenced by religious doctrines of Islam.  
Accordingly, the author will speak of   
1) the different manifestations of using logical reasoning, particularly 
analogy, in Qur’anic arguments, e.g. for the existence of God and 
resurrection after death; 
2) some contradictions or paradoxes seen by different opponents in 
the verses of Qur’an; 
3) the place of logic in the classification of disciplines and the courses 
taught at the schools and seminaries; 
4) the influence of the attitudes of different religious sects on logic; 
5) the instrumental role of logic for both religious and secular 
reasonings; and  
6) the relation between reason and dogmatic religious doctrines, and 
the reflection  of this relation on progress or recession of logic in 
medieval Islamic world. 
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NEWTON DA COSTA AND JEAN-YVES BEZIAU 
 
IS GOD PARACONSISTENT? 
 
Federal University of Santa Catarina - UFSC, Brazil 
ncacosta@terra.com.br 
University of Brazil and University of California, San Diego - UCSD/USA 
jyb.logician@gmail.com 
 
We say that an object is paraconsistent iff it has both a property P and the 
negation #P of this property, # being a paraconsistent negation, that is to 
say an operator not obeying the principle of explosion (from P and #P, 
everything follows) but having enough properties to be considered as a 
negation. We are considering here "object" in a very general and abstract 
sense: any kind of thing or being. A quanton can be considered as a 
paraconsistent object being both a particle and a non particle (a wave). We 
defend here  that God is a paraconsistent object, having many 
paraconsistent properties. 
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PURUSHOTTAMA BILIMORIA 
 
THINKING NEGATION AND NOTHINGNESS IN 
EARLY HINDUISM AND CLASSICAL INDIAN 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
Denkin University and Melbourne University, Australia 
p.bilimoria@unimelb.edu.au 
 
In this lecture I examine a number of different kinds of negation developed 
in Indian thought, from ancient religious texts to classical philosophy, in 
main, from Ṛg Veda, the Mīmāṃsā, Jaina to Buddhist theorizing on the 
possibility of Nothing, or at least not having any firm beliefs on what-is as 
if it always was and will be.  I will ask if the positions being developed 
share the logical strictures of consistency, non-contradiction, parsimony, 
and elegance; or whether they suggest alternative perspectives on these 
very principles of reasoning. 
I begin with Ṛg Veda X. 129 (nāsadīyasūkta) which in Sanskrit has 
this structure: nāsadāsīn no sadāsīt tadānīṃ (note the occurrence of the 
negation twice in conjunction: asat, 'non-existence' and na 'neither'). 
Various hermeneutical devices, including abduction (not unlike Peirce's) 
have been deployed over two millennia to unpack this arresting statement, 
or be it provocative poetical musing, for its meaning (that had preoccupied 
many a German thinker also). Pacitti (1991) considers ten different 
possibilities in respect of the function of the negation (and its negation); I 
adapt four major ones here: 
1. There was not what-is-not, and there was not what-is, then 
2. Both what-is-not was not and what-is was not. 
3. (what-is-not was there) and  (what-is was there) 
4. It can neither be asserted nor denied that what-is-not was nor that 
what-is was 
What is going on here? Is it a rejection of dual negation  via 
assertion of single negation? Or, declaring the impossibility of linguistic 
assertion (4/). Perhaps inconsistent readings arise only when one takes 
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properties of the constituent parts as though they are properties of the 
whole; reasoning in either direction yields different kinds of negation.  
Many scholars have been rather apologetic, but I wish to argue from a 
retrospective genealogy that tracks back through the Mīmāṃsā's treatment 
of exclusionary negation (demarcating negative properties of sacrifice; 
later, rules for the Grammarians, e.g. the unformed N [F(x)]   N[F(x)] 
) and perceiving absence (abhāva) (the absolute non-presence of God), the 
Jaina logic of syādvāda or saptabaṅgi (seven steps to para-conclusion),  
and the Buddhist Nāgārjuna's catuṣkoṭi (four-cornered logic), especially the 
4
th
 lemma: There neither is [self, causality, God], nor is there not [self, 
causality, God]. 'Did the Buddha die of pork-poisoning?' will yield the 
same lemma; it is not just the rejection of excluded-middle, but seriously 
grounds contradiction within transcendental para-thinking. Hence, Buddhist 
logic of prasaṅgika and thinking on Emptiness (Śūnyatā) did not arise in 
some vacuum but rather as a culmination of reasoning from negation afoot 
since Ṛg Veda X.129.  I end the paper with some paralogical overlaps with 
Heidegger's thinking on Nothingness and ex creatio nihilo. 
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RAZVAN DIACONESCU 
 
THE LOGICAL NATURE OF THE NALANDA 
TRADITION OF BUDDHISM 
 
Simion Stoilow Institute of Mathematics of the Romanian Academy 
(IMAR), Romania 
razvansdiaconescu@gmail.com 
 
In contemporary Tibetan Buddhism, which inherits the old Indian Buddhist 
tradition of Nalanda in a rather complete way, logic plays an active role at  
various levels.  
The importance of logic in the process of spiritual development of 
Buddhist  practitioners can be traced back to the central methodological 
principle  formulated by Buddha Shakyamuni himself, that any truth can be 
accepted  only upon an extensive and careful analysis performed on a 
personal basis.  In this talk we will explore the role played by logic in the 
Mahayana Buddhist thinking, both from a historical and methodological 
perspective and will discuss possible  captures of Buddhist logics as 
modern formal logical systems.   
We will also briefly look at the relationship between logic and 
Buddhist thinking from the other side, namely some influence of the 
Buddhism perspective to modern logic, especially to the universal trend in 
logic. 
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Observed data make a scientific theory which purports to explain those 
data  probable insofar as (1) if the theory is true, it is probable that the data 
will occur, (2) if the theory is false, it is not probable  that the data will 
occur, and (3) the theory is simple. Some of the traditional arguments for 
the existence of God can be expressed  as arguments from the most general 
features of the universe to a theory (theism, the theory that there is a God) 
which purports to explain these features.; and so they can be assessed by 
how well those criteria are satisfied.  I claim that, taken together as one 
argument, these arguments make theism probable. That argument can be 
formalized by means of the probability calculus, and in particular by 
Bayes's theorem. 
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MATHEMATICIANS AND THEIR GODS 
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To open a newspaper or turn on the television it would appear that science 
and religion are polar opposites - mutually exclusive bedfellows competing 
for hearts and minds. There is little indication of the rich interaction 
between religion and science throughout history, much of which continues 
today. From ancient to modern times, mathematicians have played a key 
role in this interaction.  
Snezana will expand on this relationship between mathematics and 
religious beliefs. She will show, via different examples which are 
represented in this book, that throughout scientific history, mathematics has 
been used to make sense of the 'big' questions of life. In this search for 
answers, religious beliefs sometimes drove mathematicians to mathematics 
to help them make sense of the world.  
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ADENIYI SUNDAY AND FASORO 
 
LOGIC VOCABULARIES AND NATURAL LANGUAGE 
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Logical vocabularies are words of ordinary language, and each of them 
does not make sense on their own, also there are disagreements about what 
they mean, and their meanings change over time. So how can logicians 
possibly discern the rules for the correct use of logical constants? This 
paper answers the question by trying to discover naturalistic explanations 
for at least the core meaning of some of these words by trying to see what 
central purposes such words serve, and so to elicit and hence justify some 
of the rules for their logical behaviour (Goldstein, 2005). 
The question of what the logical constants mean is certainly not a 
straightforward one. Scholars have made efforts to give precise definitions 
of the logical constants, one that attempt to capture the intuition that logical 
truth and logic validity are due to the meaning of these constant. It certainly 
seems clear that connectives, quantifiers and other logical constants have 
definable roles in inferences; specified quite clearly in the rules for their 
introduction and elimination (Hofweber, 2010). Yet, unless logic provides 
us a kind of certain level of logical knowhow that is, the definitions, 
explanations and conventions of the formal systems it will be faced with 
difficulties, and there will be a gap between the use of these constants in 
English and logic.  
This paper evaluates relationship in the usage of sentence 
connectives and predicate quantifications in logic, and their usage in 
ordinary language. It shows that logic is reduced to a purely formal science 
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dealing only with linguistic expression without any reference to meaning. 
Truth is only confined to the forms of statements. Since logic is about clear 
and distinct language. It means that logic tries to determine the rules 
governing the use of language discourse. Therefore, subject matter of logic 
lies in the relationship between thought process and language. This paper, 
first, consider whether the logical constants represent the expressions of our 
natural language. Second, it examines whether truth can only be confined 
to the forms of arguments without recourse to the contents of such 
arguments. The result shows that logic of pure form cannot fully capture 
the inferential meaning of our ordinary language.   
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In the theistic view and monotheistic religions such as Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, it is believed that God is Personal, Omniscient, 
Omnipotent and Absolutely good Who has spoken to human beings and has 
revealed Himself through revelation and religious experiences (Peterson…, 
2003). The believers pray to God and live in the hopes of His contributions 
and blessing. But sometimes the same believers face the dilemma of Divine 
hiding or God’s silence. This problem may create a serious challenge in the 
believers’ stance. In such circumstances the believers may encounter 
scepticism and lose hope. 
          It seems that the problem relates to evils and religious 
presuppositions. First cause of the problem is evils (natural and moral): If 
God existed and He was Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Absolutely good, He 
would not allow evil to exist (Inwagen, 2005). Why such an Omniscient, 
Omnipotent and Perfectly good being don’t prevent the abundant and 
considerable evils? (Rowe, 1992) Second cause of the problem is religious 
presuppositions: Many believers perceive God incorrectly; for example, 
they have an anthropomorphic perception of Divine attributes and action 
and therefore, they expect God to intervene in earthly affairs and to show 
Himself and His power and love in human life directly. Why such a God is 
silent and do anything?   
          According to a religious and metaphysical view, God is Absolute and 
His Absoluteness demands Infinitude, Perfection and All-Possibility. Such 
a God is the Good and, therefore, He communicates itself through creation 
the world, alike of sun's radiation. Since radiation is a separation from the 
source of light, the world as such cannot be absolutely good, and evil is one 
of the world's limitations (Schuon, 1991). In other words, it is a crucial 
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distinction between the "absolute Absolute" and the "relative Absolute": 
God is infinite and because of His infinitude He comprises the dimension 
of relativity, and because of this dimention He manifests the world. Since 
world is manifestation, the Divine relativity, which is a determination and 
limitation, gives rise to "evil" (Schuon, 1984) and therefore "evil" is evil 
"insofar as it opposes the Real and consequently opposes our ultimate 
interests, but not in respect of its existence nor again in respect of some 
function that is necessary for the equilibrium of the world" (Schuon, 2000). 
If the believers realize the relationships between the Absolute and Its 
manifestation, and the relationships of God's Transcendence and 
Immanence, they could conceive Divine attributes and action correctly, and 
therefore their expectations would be reasonable. Divine reality is evident: 
"We shall show them Our signs in the horizons and in themselves, till it is 
clear to them that it is the truth."( Holy Qur'an 41:53). We will get the 
message of God and receive the God's Spirit only if we are silent and 
opening our hearts' eyes to see and ears to hear (Moser, 2003). "But a 
natural man does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are 
foolishness to him; and he cannot understand them, because they are 
spiritually appraised" (1 Corinthians 2:14). 
          The attempt is made in this article to study the available causes- evil 
and religious presuppositions- regarding God’s silence and to respond to 
the problem through interpretation of the same evil and religious 
presuppositions. Through appropriate interpretation and explanation of this 
paradoxical issue it is hopped that the believers will resort to God even if 
He keeps silent. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
INWAGEN, P.V. 2005. "The problem of evil" In: Wainwright, W.J.(ed.), 
Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 188-219. 
MOSER, P.K. 2003. "Cognitive inspiration and knowledge of God" In: 
Copan, P. and Moser, P.(eds.), The Rationality of Theism, London and 
New York: Routledge, pp. 55-71. 
 
35 Abstracts 
PETERSON, M., HASKER, W., REICHENBACH, B. and BASINGER, D. 
2003. Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Religion. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
ROWE, W. L. 1992. "The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism" 
In: Geivett, R.D. and Sweetman, B.(eds), Contemporary Perspectives 
on Religious Epistemology, Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, pp.33-42. 
SCHUON, F. 1984. Logic and Transcendence. London: Perennial Books. 
SCHUON, F. 1991. "Sophia Perennis" In: Nasr, S.H.(ed.), The Essential 
Writings of Frithjof Schuon, U.S.A.: Element, pp.534 – 539. 
SCHUON, F. 2000. Survey of Metaphysics and Esoterism. U.S.A.: World 
Wisdom Books.   
 
 
 
  
 
36 Handbook of the 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion 
ALBERTO LEOPOLDO BATISTA NETO 
 
RELIGIOUS PRESUPPOSITIONS OF LOGIC AND 
RATIONALITY 
 
Integrated Graduate Philosophy Program, Federal University of Paraíba 
(UFPB)/Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE)/ Federal University of 
Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN), CAPES Scholarship, Brazil 
albertolbneto@yahoo.com.br 
 
The widely acknowledged crisis of rationality in contemporary 
philosophical culture could not leave unaffected  the field of Logic. John 
Woods claims that the discipline has reached a postmodern stage (Woods, 
2003). Postmodernity itself is not without a theological dimension. As 
Nietzsche  saw, the antitheological turn of modernity hid – malgré lui – 
some definite theological commitments. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that the 
lack of recognition of its dependency on the conceptual framework that 
invested its vocabulary and theses of their meanings within the pre-modern 
tradition led modern moral rationality to its débâcle – by making it subject 
to the devastating Nietzschean criticism. The same could be applied to 
theoretical reason – as Nietzsche himself did not fail to see (MacIntyre, 
2007). Indeed MacIntyre asserts elsewhere that the acceptance of 
theoretical first principles – and among these are the so-called logical 
principles, as noncontradiction and excluded middle –  in classical 
philosophy is closely related to the recognition of final ends (MacIntyre, 
1990). It may be argued that both sets of principles – and thence both 
theoretical and practical rationality – are somehow rooted in a religious 
worldview. Josef Pieper, for instance, argues that Philosophy’s relation to 
religion is a necessary and constitutive one (Pieper, 1952). A sign of such 
relation, as concerning Logic specifically, appears when one considers for 
instance how Louis Rougier’s logical relativism connects to his anti-
Christian stance (Béziau, 2014). Contemporary philosophical culture’s 
resistance to accept first principles and the inadequacy of modern logical 
theory as a (part of) a full-fledged account of rationality perhaps can be 
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traced back to their alienation from the tradition of enquiry that first 
conferred upon their purported object its original meaning and context, 
being a tradition radically informed with deep religious concerns. 
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“Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a 
name meaning.” Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, § 3.3. With such words, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein evoked the main philosophical dogma of his time, 
representing what later Habermas called paradigm of the knowledge of 
objects. A paradigm which the production of sense was subordinate to the 
representation of the things of the world, and claimed that the sense of an 
enunciation was the very designated object. Later, a movement endorsed by 
several logicians, among which, Wittgenstein itself, Willard Van Orman 
Quine, Peter Frederick Strawson, and more recently, Chaïm Perelman and 
Stephen Toulmin, for only say a few, has turned against this conception of 
logic and language, preparing the ground for the comprehension of the non-
thetical forms of reasoning, which is, unconclusive, for not have the 
pretension of saying “real” things about the world. The objective of this 
paper is to analize wich rationality model can be ascribed to the Diamond 
Sutra (Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra), taking in consideration the 
concept of language found in Prajñāpāramitā literature, the Two Truths 
Doctrine, and emphasizing the Upaya concept (The Conventional Truth 
ably manipulated to pedagogical and soteriological ends). In the Sutra, 
Buddha affirms that the disciple who seeks the Perfect Wisdom (Anuttara-
samyak-sambodhi) must put away not only the ideas of self identity, others 
identity, living beings or an universal soul (Brahman), but should also put 
away the ideas concerning the non-existence of these conceptions, that is, 
the idea concerning the world can’t be neither affirmative nor negative, but 
should be suspended of both judgments, approaching notably of pirronic’s 
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epokhé. Which theoretical framework here in ocident is able to reflect 
about the conceptions of logic and language underlying the Diamond 
Sutra? In this sense, Heinrich Zimmer gives us clues about the subject, 
affirming, in his “Philosophy of India”, that the emptiness concept was 
employed in Madhyamaka’s doctrine as an pedagogical instrument, both 
convenient and eficient, to condut the mind beyond the duality sense 
(ZIMMER, 2008). Is this instrumental usage of language that will 
characterize what whe thought to be an argumentative rationality, for being 
unconclusive and pragma-rhetorical. The theme falls into the ambit of the 
pragmatic turn of philosophy, which occurs the disruption of the idea that 
meaning is naming, and Toulmin and Perelman criticisms of traditional 
conceptions of logic that exclude from the ambit of rationality most of the 
ways of human reasoning: the reasoning between the controvertial or the 
reasoning about what can or cannot be, or yet, in another terms, the topic-
rethoric reasoning. 
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In this essay, my aim is to show that Leibniz’s ontological proof is based 
upon a distinction between two different kinds of metaphysical conceptions 
of the predicate of existence – i.e. if on the one hand Leibniz refers to the 
objects of our actual world (entia creata) as existent in the standard 
Fregean-Russellian way, on the other hand, referring to God, the sense of 
this predicate is modified and considered as an analytical, real property, 
inseparable from God’s own essence. 
In his A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Bertrand 
Russell points out that this amphibological use of the same predicate makes 
the Leibnizian system incoherent (Russell, 1996); indeed, if we want to 
support a standard conception of the sense of existence, we must also give 
up the Leibnizian ontological argument. Nevertheless, if we want to 
consider existence as a real property, then we are bound to claim that all 
possible essences – or, in Leibniz’s words, complete notions – are 
exemplified. In spite of this, I will support the thesis that Leibniz was well-
aware of the switch he introduced in his metaphysical system, as can 
clearly be seen by analyzing his correspondence with Henning Huthmann, 
dated January 1678 (A, II, 585 – 591). If we concentrate on these very 
letters, we could build a new emended interpretation of the Leibnizian 
ontological argument, based on the compossibility of all perfections. This 
would be immune to the notorious Kantian objection, according to which 
existence must be considered only as an absolute position of an object with 
all its predicates (Kant, 1998). Taking this objection into a due account, I 
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will argue that one can agree with Kant’s conception, without rejecting 
Leibniz’s proof.   
My claim is that the Kantian objection applies only to contingent 
creatures; indeed, for such objects, if the property of existence belongs to 
them in an analytical way, their creation by God would be redundant. 
However, if we consider the case of the subject of all perfections, namely 
God, we can consistently argue that «In the realm of eternal truths […], a 
parte rei, exist Unity, Circle, Power, Identity, and other realities or forms, 
or perfections; in the same way, […] we can find actual existence. 
However, this is not the same as the one that could be found in our world, 
rather this is a specific universal form, which if linked to another essence 
(or form), is inseparably linked. Because of this, it turns out that a 
Necessary Being actually exists» (A, II, 590, Author’s Translation). 
Finally, I will show how this account fits with the version of the 
argument that Leibniz provides in his late essay Sur la Démonstration 
Cartesienne de l’Éxistence de Dieu du R.P. Lamy, according to which 
without a Necessary Being, no contingent substance would be possible. 
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Nature of life and death is the question and concern of every human being. 
We try briefly to show how Motahhari, as a thinker of Islamic Scholars, 
answers to this question. It is certain that he, as the Islamic philosopher and 
theologian, explain the following questions with the different 
principle.Questions such as: What is human life? Does having vital signs 
can be said to be living man? What is death? Is the death destruction and 
annihilation or evolution and transmission? Do life and death of man have 
connected with nature and the system in which they are or not? And so on. 
 The answer to these questions, from the perspective of Motahhari, 
depends on the understanding of man’s place in the cosmos. In fact, we 
must know that how the system of being and also what is the man’s place 
in it. In his explanation of the system of being, he described the Causality. 
Causality is the “relation between two things that one of them is cause and 
the other is effect” (Motahhari, 2006). This relation is the deepest relations. 
Because the cause give the existence to the effect. In this system of 
Causality, according to the principle of “impossibility of succession of 
causes”, the effects should be leading to the cause that it is self-existent. 
This cause is first cause. “Consistency principle” is another important 
principle of causality. This principle means that there is a special 
relationship between cause and effect. In theology anything other than god 
is effect, and god is the first cause. As well, according to the theological 
principle, the essense of god and his attributes is the same.One of the 
attributes of god is living being.Then, according to the principle of the 
identity of essense and attribute, living being has identity with his 
essense.The living god, it means that he is wise and mighty (Motahhari, 
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2011). Sinse, the god  as  the first cause   is consistent with the effect, man 
will always alive. In motahhari’s view, death is related with life. Because, 
death is the transition from one life to another life (Motahhari,1998), that is 
kind of becoming. So, in his view, death isn’t destruction and annihilation 
but death is kind of life.   
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This paper considers the thought of Wittgenstein, especially the period of 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Contemporary philosophy affirms that 
metaphysic propositions do not exist because in this suppose propositions 
contain elements without content that can be descriptive. The metaphysic 
propositions are composed by transcendental elements, and this kind of 
elements cannot be proved. This is a problem to Wittgenstein. The 
philosophical perspective of the young Wittgenstein understands that a 
proposition is only able to be authentic and, therefore, make sense when it 
refers to elements that are located in the world. When it comes to the 
mystical sphere and, specifically, of religion, Wittgenstein considers that 
there is no possibility of issuing any such proposition, by this 
transcendental being. In this sense, it is understandable the impossibility of 
a religious speech, since the guidelines of the philosopher, religion can not 
be expressed through scientific language. The elements that constitute the 
framework of the religious are not factual, it determines a lack of 
descriptive content. To the philosopher, the impossibility of religious 
propositions is due the transcendental nature of religion. In this sense, a 
proposition is possible only when it is within the world. This is not the case 
of religion. What reveals the impossibility of talking is because necessarily 
shown. Is the order of grace, therefore, is essentially contemplative. Taking 
into consideration the development of such policies, we realized that trying 
to put religion in propositions means making inappropriate use of language. 
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Our aim with this work is to discuss the Kalam cosmological argument 
(KCA) and its implications as posted by the american philosopher William 
Lane Craig (1949), who presents a recapitulated version of it (1979; 1994; 
2000) as a step for his case in support of the existence of the christian God. 
We also shall try to cover the main critiques concerning this new version of 
the argument. As it is known, the Kalam cosmological argument is a 
recapture of the cosmological argument as was posed by the persian and 
muslin theologian of the 11
th
 century Al-Ghazali – the word “Kalam” is an 
allusion to the Arabic expression that means the discipline of muslin 
rational theology. The argument can be stated by a simple syllogism: P1, 
“Everything that begins to exist has a cause”, P2, “The universe began to 
exist” and C, “Therefore, the universe has a cause”. The argument has a 
strong influence of the Aristotelian metaphysics and the notion of prime-
mover, although Craig’s evidences for premises and conclusion relies on 
modern science. For Craig, the evidence for the first premise is initially 
intuitive, but also based on the mere notion of causality and in quantum 
physics; for the second premise, Craig uses as support the theory of Big 
Bang, i.e., notions of modern cosmology and the logical problems with 
infinites: the Universe simply need a beginning because material infinites 
are impossible, in case of the Universe be infinite it simply would not exist 
because it would never started to exist. Therefore, made the case for the 
premises, we are allowed to conclude that the universe has a cause and, by 
definition, this cause has to be some kind of immaterial, transcendental, 
timeless and spaceless deity, since only such a being could present the 
attributes required for causing the Universe. The KCA version offered by 
William Lane Craig has been widely criticized and the main critiques came 
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from Graham Oppy (1995; 1997; 2000; 2009), Quentin Smith (1993) and 
Dan Barker (1999). 
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Analytical philosophers of religion who take the connection between logic 
and religion as a given are naturally concerned with the question as to 
whether a specific religion offers, at the very least, a consistent theory 
about how things are. Opponents of this form of philosophy consider this is 
a waste of time, because offering a consistent theory about how things are 
is a task for science rather than religion. Since there have been many 
philosophers and theorists of religion who have argued that there is an 
opposition between logical (or propositional) thinking and religious 
thinking, for example D. Z. Phillips (Phillips, 2004) and  John Caputo 
(Caputo, 2006), it is worthwhile demonstrating that there is in fact an 
essential connection between logic and religion. 
By logic, I refer to deductive logic, that is the study of validity. 
Validity is a property of those arguments in which it is irrational to assert 
the premises and deny the conclusion. Following a long tradition, we can 
apply the word ‘proposition’ to anything suitable to serve as a premise or 
conclusion. In recognizing that an argument is valid, we must be true to the 
meanings of the premises and conclusion as antecedently given, or the 
whole activity of deduction loses its point. The discourse must already be 
such that there is the possibility of recognizing incompatibilities that must 
be rejected. I observe that even Graham Priest, the leading dialetheic 
logician, seems to accept some such restriction on validity, (Priest, 1999). 
So, we must know that religious language is propositional by nature before 
we can start applying logical standards.   
The proof that religious language is by nature propositional comes 
from the fact that people who are religious can be criticized for hypocrisy – 
 
48 Handbook of the 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion 
it can be said that their actions are in contradiction to their words. If we 
encounter a tribe that performs an elaborate dance once a week, we would 
not necessarily describe this as a religious ritual. However, if it emerged 
that dancers could be criticized for behaviour that, in some way, failed to 
live up to whatever the dance expressed, then we would say that the dance 
fulfilled a necessary condition for being a religious ritual. Following Robert 
Brandom, (Brandom, 1994), I suggest that it is because we have this 
socially necessary skill, the ability to criticize those who fail to live up to 
their words, that we have propositions and, therefore, logic.  
I note, that this argument for treating religious language as 
necessarily propositional does not imply that religious language also 
involves ontological commitments.  A purely practical language would still 
be propositional. However, I think that one motive that has led some 
philosophers to deny that religion has ontological commitments is the belief 
that science must obey logic because it represents the world, so if religion 
does not attempt to represent the world, it is not bound by propositional 
rules. Following Brandom, again, I suggest that practical commitments 
make possible representational language with its ontological commitments. 
Therefore, if the arguments of the presentation are correct, one important 
objection to the view that it is an important task to discover whether a 
specific religion provides a consistent picture of how things are has been 
overcome.   
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The medieval Provençal rabbi, Levi ben Gershon (Gersonides, 1288-1344) 
is known for works encompassing biblical commentary, mathematics, 
astronomy, logic and philosophy. While much of his work is couched in the 
language of commentary, he made many original contributions, and as 
noted by Langerman, “integrated his particular understanding on each issue 
… into one comprehensive and consistent system of thought.” This paper 
considers the degree to which ben Gershom’s approach to mathematics can 
be termed constructive. 
Feldman has observed that in his analysis of infinite divisibility, 
Gersonides takes a position which could be called constructive “in the 
sense employed by the intuitionist school of mathematics”. I take up this 
observation and will attempt to examine it in finer detail in various works 
of Gersonides encompassing finite mathematics, geometry, numerical 
computation, physics, and accounts of divine knowledge. There is a 
constructive element in all of these works, and the analysis of God's 
knowledge of particulars presented in the third treatise of Wars of the Lord 
is in fact not only constructive, but in some sense intuitionistic, as it 
introduces a transcendental subjective element into mathematical 
knowledge, and describes a “construction” of the continuum via a kind of 
choice sequence. 
.In order to truly appreciate ben Gershom's remarkable account of 
God's knowledge of the continuum from a mathematical perspective, it is 
necessary to consider his approach to related problems in a number of 
areas. His comments on the infinity of the line in the Treatise on Geometry 
indicate that he subscribes to a form of finitism. However, this finitism 
does not arise from physical considerations, but rather from the intrinsic 
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nature of quantity. The introduction of mathematical induction in Maase 
Hoshev, as a principle independent of any particular application, suggests a 
constructive model of the integers. Finally, turning to Wars of the Lord we 
find an epistemic account of the nature of the continuum. A critique of 
Maimonides’ homonymy depicts a God who could be viewed as a version 
of Goodman's “knowing mathematician”. This is followed by an account of 
God's knowledge of the continuum, in particular that God “knows that 
whatever is divided retains within itself the possibility of being divided 
further insofar as it possesses quantity – not that He knows the end of a 
division that, by its very nature has no end,” an assertion which may at least 
be considered “semi-intuitionistic”. Reaching the most speculative step of 
my argument, I contend that in his critique of the accounts of Aristotle's 
notion of completed and potential infinities presented by Ibn Rushd, 
Gersonides takes a position which is indeed intuitionistic. 
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In this talk Kant’s scintillatingly brief remarks from the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals regarding the Categorical Imperative having a 
“form”, “matter”, and a “complete determination”, are subjected to 
scrutiny. Kant had identified the three forms of the Categorical Imperative 
(the Universal Law Formulation, the Humanity Formulation, and the 
Kingdom of Ends Formulation), with these respectively. The curious 
consequence is that the Kingdom of Ends is the “complete determination” 
of the Categorical Imperative insofar as it involves the complete 
determination of all maxims of action. The reason this is interesting and 
important is that, since for Kant the moral law is heard in our conscience as 
if spoken in the voice of God, the complete determination of maxims of 
action is the complete determination of the will of God in the lives of 
human beings who belong to a special kind of community, the Kingdom of 
Ends. So the Kingdom of Ends, when perceived in empirical terms as a set 
of all moral actions, would be in Kant’s view a phenomenal manifestation 
of the noumenal will of God. This view alone reveals deep and interesting 
features of Kant’s position regarding the theological ground of social 
norms. 
Moreover, this thesis about the content and structure of morality 
may be connected with Kant’s transcendental theology in the theoretical 
context: the idea of God, as identified in the Transcendental Ideal in the 
Critique of Pure Reason with the ens realissimum, served for Kant as the 
idea of a singular which contained the “perfection” of all possible 
predicates which may be instanced in empirical judgment. In the moral 
context, the complete determination of maxims of action occurs by it being 
brought about that God’s will is satisfied, for it is that to which we are 
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meant to aspire by perfecting our action collectively as a community. In the 
epistemic context, the complete determination of individual things in the 
world of sense, in judgment, is meant to occur through the logical and 
metaphysical establishment of the place of those predicates in an 
indeterminate and unknowable theological entity in which it is, according 
to Kant, nevertheless meant to be rational to believe. 
The nature of the connection between these two aspects of Kant’s 
thought in his theory of epistemic and moral judgment is the topic of the 
talk. This particular approach to understanding the unity of Kant’s 
transcendental theology is fruitful since it allows for key structural features 
of his view about the unity of reason to be rendered clearer. The key idea to 
be explained and defended is that for Kant the idea of God serves as a 
ground of complete determination in both theoretical and practical uses of 
reason. Some critical comments are made about the broader implications of 
this Kantian view. 
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The axioms in Gödel’s ontological proof (Scott, 2004) entail what is called 
modal collapse (Sobel, 1987, 2004): the formula 𝜑 →  □𝜑 holds for any 
formula 𝜑 and not just for ∃𝑥. 𝐺𝑜𝑑(𝑥) as intended. This fact has led to 
strong criticism of the argument and stimulated attempts to remedy the 
problem. One of those attempts (Anderson, 1990) sparked a controversy 
between Hájek and Anderson regarding the redundancy of some axioms in 
Anderson’s theory. 
 Although Hájek (1996, 2001) rightfully claimed the redundancy of 
two axioms in Anderson’s (1990) theory, he still seems to have accepted 
Anderson’s rebuttal (Anderson & Gettings, 1996) and proposed three new 
emendations (Hájek, 2002) which contain the axioms in question. 
Surprisingly, our analysis shows that the two axioms are still independent 
in one of the emendations, and superfluous in all of them. 
 The controversy over the superfluousness of the two axioms 
indicates a trend to reduce the ontological argument to its bare essentials. In 
this regard, Anderson (1990) introduces another variant of the argument in 
which many of the axioms become derivable. A high level of minimality is 
also achieved by Bjørdal (1998) by taking the property of being God-like as 
a primitive. 
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 Many of the properties of those variants depend on the exact modal 
system being used and whether constant or varying domain semantics are 
employed. In our work, we took these conditions into account in order to 
provide a thorough computer assisted analysis of the mentioned arguments.  
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Published in 1908, and written by invitation of his friend the mathematician 
Cassius J. Keiser for The Hibbert Journal, C.S. Peirce’s “A Neglected 
Argument for the Reality of God” (Peirce, 1992) presents Peirce’s 
entanglement of scientific method and theology. One of his most difficult 
and carefully written texts, this article sketches a “humble” argument for 
the reality – and not the existence – of God for musers, that is, those who 
pursue the activity Peirce calls “musement”. In this article, the author 
defines “musement” as a non-reflective mental activity, capable of giving a 
sort of instinctive response to produce a strong belief in the reality of God. 
Such a belief would gain plausibility for it is reflected in conduct, 
nonetheless the argument is not in itself a matter of reasoning. Peirce 
claims that in musement we can achieve a kind of perception of the 
intertwinement of the Three Universes of Experience, the Universe of 
Feeling, the Universe of Brute Fact, and the Universe of Reason that 
mediates between the other two. He also somehow relates each of these 
Universes to the distinct phases of inquiry, Induction, Deduction, and 
Abduction or Retroduction, but without a deeper discussion, leaving mainly 
to the reader to discover. The way he explains his claims allows him to 
outline God as an abductive hypothesis that explains how the Three 
Universes make up a whole. Peirce also distinguishes between Argument 
and Argumentation, and this is important because his humble argument 
seems in fact more like an Argumentation. So, Peirce believes the Reality 
of God can be demonstrated from the humble argument. The Neglected 
Argument seems to be that few have really considered how the musement 
on the very idea of God can lead to its acceptance and belief, after all. In 
order to ground this claim, Peirce writes a very long and meticulously 
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written text, dealing with his most original ideas on scientific method and 
human evolution. One of the key-features is his discussion of G. Galilei’s 
lume naturale: why our instinct to guess right is so often well-succeeded? 
In this presentation, we aim at throwing some light at these points, focusing 
on how the scientific method and logic of discovery can ground a belief in 
a very heterodox conception of a supreme deity. This concept, it is my 
claim, is not restricted by the traditional Occidental concepts about its 
nature or even religious practice.  
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In Philebus, Plato depicts Socrates and Protarchus (pages 24a to 26d) 
engaged in the question of how the finite is equated with the determined, 
and the infinite is presented as that which has no limits, as the 
undetermined. This discussion will be an explicit reference for Hegel both 
in his Shorter Logics and in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. In 
the former, Plato’s Philebus is used as a reference on the question of 
determination and actuality, as it is presented in §89 to §95 of the Doctrine 
of Being, the first part of the Hegelian treatment of Logics. Those 
paragraphs deal with the specific question of determinate being and here, 
Hegel affirms tow things: first, that the distinction between the finite and 
the infinite is a nullity; second, he criticizes the idea that, within the unity 
of the finite with the infinite, the latter remains as the negative aspect.  
However, Plato’s text is also explicitly quoted in Hegel’s Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Religion, specifically in the Lectures of 1824, in a 
section called “The Transition to the Speculative Standpoint of Religion”. 
What Hegel calls the “speculative standpoint”, is precisely the only point of 
view in which one can grasp the truth of religion, namely, the relation 
between God and men, that is, of the infinite and the finite. In addition to 
that, in the very same Lecture, Hegel defines the Incarnation of God 
[Menschwerdung Gottes] as the “speculative midpoint” of the Christian 
religion (HEGEL, 2007, v1 p. 245). Following this path, therefore, it is 
possible to argue that Hegel uses Plato’s Philebus again, in the Lectures, to 
expose what he calls the “speculative standpoint of religion” as the 
dialectics between the finite and the infinite within God’s own being. Here, 
the narrative on the Incarnation of God presented by Hegel is analysed as 
 
58 Handbook of the 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion 
culminating point in the process of determination and actualization of the 
concept of God. The aim of this article is to explore the possible relations 
between those two uses in order to find a common Hegelian approach 
between logics and religion and, therefore, to explore a possible 
interpretation on the logics of the Incarnation of God. 
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Marcos (Marcos, 2005) introduces a non-normal modal logic of essence 
and accident (EA). His aim was to add clarity to the discussion in formal 
metaphysics of concepts such as essence and necessity, and the appropriate 
duals. To this end, he introduced an operator ∘ such that, when applied to a 
formula j, the intended interpretation is “j is essential”. As can be seen by 
its semantic definition, the ∘ operator is responsible for the non-normality 
of the resulting logics: 
M,x |= ∘ iff M,x |=  or (y W)(xRy  M,y |= ) 
 In (Marcos, 2005) a sound and complete axiomatization of the 
minimal logic for such a semantics was provided. This result was later 
improved (Steinsvold, 2008), accounting for the analogs of T, S4, and S4.3. 
In this talk we answer some open questions posed in (Marcos, 2005). 
Among them, we are able to provide theorem describing when a particular 
class of frames is characterizable in terms of a logic of essence and 
accident. Interestingly enough, the modal logic S5---often assumed to be 
the most metaphysically appropriate, and where some ontological proofs 
are formalized---is, in this context, identified with the modal logic E, which 
is normally strictly weaker than S5. This collapse is due, we argue, to the 
axiom p  ◽àp. 
 Theorem: The logic of essence and accident corresponding to E is 
a sound and complete axiomatization of the set of all EA-formulas valid on 
S5-frames. 
 In conclusion, we will discuss the metaphysical difference between 
this approach to essence in terms of propositions, that we may call 
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metaphysical, and the more classical one about objects, often referred to as 
ontological.  
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The cumulative case for God and religion is summarized by constructing a 
tree of arguments with the trunk representing the conclusion and the 
branches being families of premises or appeals leading to the conclusion.  
All actual arguments or non-evidentiary preaching is either on the list or 
can be subsumed under the divisions of the list by adding more branches.   
 The tree is first divided into the main branches of fideism and non-
fideism.   Fideism is  reliance upon faith with dismissal  of reason.  The 
range of fideistic approaches may be exhaustively divided under the 
rubrics: (1) Pascal, (2) Kierkegaard, (3) James, (4) Wittgenstein, where the 
numbered branches are terminal.  These designations are convenient labels 
and do not necessarily represent the historical literature fairly, as the 
branches of the tree will show. 
 Non-fideistic lines rely on reason and dismiss a faith-based 
approach.  Following Kant, the non-fideistic lines may be exhaustively 
divided into the (5) a priori and the a posteriori, with the a posteriori 
divided into  (6) those whose primary premise is that the world exists and 
those whose primary premises catalog certain properties of the world.  
Those that appeal to properties of the world are further divided into the 
appeal to (7) design in nature, and the appeal to art and artifact, with art and 
artifact further divided into (8) objects and (9) testimony. 
 These nine paths to God and religion have been well trod, and 
many have reported success.  Therefore, the burden of proof is on the 
objector who claims these lines of thought do not lead to God.  Some 
opponents will refuse the burden, so we must add (10) arguments showing 
that the burden of proof is on those who raise objections to an established 
and ostensibly successful practice.  Finally, since these categories all deal 
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with the insufficiency of evidence in one form or another, files must be 
opened on those who maintain (11) all religious and metaphysical talk is 
meaningless and signifies nothing, (12) that certain positions in philosophy 
and religion are contradictory and ought to be discarded on that grounds, 
and finally (13) that the problem of evil and the sufficiency of natural 
science defeat any attempt to defend God and religion. 
 This proof goes to the existence of God and the common and 
perennial religious practice.  Some urge more than the minimum, but the 
point of this case is to defeat the opposition, while leaving room for 
individual variations as regards the details of belief and practice, and for 
the instruction of students and the unconverted with full intellectual 
integrity.  Those who insist on more than the minimum proposed here for 
the conclusion will at least see their material included in full among the 
premises and may appeal to it regarding individual practice.  Deism and 
syncretism are considered here as particular paths accepted by some, 
acknowledged in the premises, but insufficiently warranted to appear in the 
conclusion as common and perennial.  The conventional wisdom is that an 
apologist need succeed only along one line, but all arguments are open to 
reversal by the “G. E. Moore” shift, so the case in full should leave the 
opponents no room for retreat, whereas those who have stayed the course 
will have advanced to a state of consciousness sufficient for them to see 
that sophisticated formal versions of the ontological argument are valid, 
sound, and sufficient. 
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It’s the objective of this paper to make a case for an enhanced role of tarka 
in the specific context of the Upaniṣads (śruti) as understood in Advaita 
Vedānta’s teachings of Śaṅkarācārya, Sureśvarācārya and 
Satccidanandendra Saraswati I’ll sustain that tarka virtually coincides with 
śruti and constitutes the most immediate means of liberation (mokṣa). For 
that, one has to open up itself for an extraordinary meaning of tarka – akin 
to Heidegger’s ‘meditative thinking’– as a form of rationality that goes 
beyond mere inferential procedures (anumāna) and propositional 
judgments. In fact, the radical  unobjectifyability of brahman - the ever-
present Ultimate Reality - implies that śruti cannot involve, neither need to, 
any positive (onto-theo-logical) revelation of brahman and that tarka, as a 
consequence, cannot have any real ‘theological’ function to play.  
Thus, far from antinomic terms and more than just compatible 
terms, śruti and tarka seem to converge, in Advaita Vedānta, into a single 
soteriological discipline that enables men, in a definitive way, to overcome 
suffering. Accordingly, śruti is revelation in the basic sense that it reveals a 
method of dialogical reasoning (adhyāropa-apavāda) that succeeds in 
eliminating one’s ignorance (avidyā) about Reality. This systematic process 
of elimination of the fundamental errors that veil the true nature of Reality 
constitutes a method of systematic reasoning (vicāra), rigorously subsumed 
by logical principles, and made up of three basic disciplines śravaṇa 
(hearing), manana (reflecting), and nididhyāsana (contemplating). In his 
commentary to the Bhagavad-Gītā, Śaṅkarācārya states: “The knowers 
(wise men) of tradition state that, ‘that which is by nature inexpressible 
becomes expressible/taughtable through adhyāropa-apavāda method”, 
otherwise known as the rational method of ‘eliminative superimposition’.  
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My aim in this talk is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological 
argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The 
Nature of Necessity” (1974). Plantinga tries to show that this argument is 
(i) valid and (ii) it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there 
is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. Beyond 
this premise, Plantinga employs the notion of maximal greatness and 
maximal excellence. The definition of maximal greatness is the following: 
necessarily, a being is maximally great iff it has maximal excellence in 
every world. And the definition of maximal excellence is as follows:  
necessarily, a being has maximal excellence iff it has omniscience, 
omnipotence, and moral perfection. With this main premise and definitions, 
as well as with resource of modal logic and semantics of possible worlds, 
Plantinga concludes that there is a being with the proprieties of 
omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every possible world; 
since actual world is also a possible world, then this being exist in our 
world. In other words, God exists. 
To better clarify the structure of Plantinga’s modal ontological 
argument, it is worth formalizing it in quantified modal logic. So, where 
‘Gx’ is the abbreviation for ‘x is maximally great’, ‘Ex’ is the abbreviation 
for ‘x is maximally excellent’, and ‘Ox’ is the abbreviation for ‘x is 
omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect’, the argument may be 
canonically represented in the following way: 
(1) ◊∃xGx 
(2) □∀x(Gx↔□Ex) 
(3) □∀x(Ex↔Ox) 
(4) ∴ ∃xOx 
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Is this a good argument? On the one hand, I want to show that this 
argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of modal logic. On the 
other hand, I think that this argument is unsound and, for that, it is not a 
good argument to show that God exist or that it is rational to believe in 
God. My main reasons to argue for this conclusion are the following: 
 With the same argumentative structure, we can also prove the 
rationality of atheism, as well as we can even build a proof for the 
existence of Evil Demons or other fictional characters. 
 This modal argument seems to beg the question and, for that, we 
cannot show or convince anyone (without circularity) of rationality 
of main premise. 
 If the main premise is accepted as properly basic belief (like 
Plantinga seems to intend), then this ontological argument is 
useless; since, by the same reasoning, we can accept directly the 
conclusion (God exists) as a properly basic belief. 
 There are strong defeaters for the main premise of this ontological 
argument requiring a good response, like the argument from evil 
(both logical and evidential) or the argument from incompatible 
divine attributes. 
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In his essay’s about the theme of Religion Schopenhauer points to a 
contradiction between religious dogmas and practices of the faithful, 
between theology and ethics, between faith and morality. Criticizes the 
claim that the founders of religions and propagandists have contributed 
effectively to illustrate the world and have helped in the search for truth 
and the exact meaning of existence. For Schopenhauer, the revealed faith is 
firm in human consciousness mainly in infancy with concepts and theories 
that employ an austere and solemn language, making it impossible to doubt 
dominate the childlike spirit. For the philosopher, is so overwhelming 
strength of dogmas inculcated in childhood that may obscure such 
awareness that even compassion or any other humanitarian feeling may 
disappear. Religious education and the irrational faith that this generates is 
often attacked and presented as a barrier to the development of thought. 
The educational system in particular English is the criticism of 
Schopenhauer. In presenting the relationship of religion with the truth 
Schopenhauer makes a distinction that will be essential to understand his 
ideas on philosophy and religion. The truth, according to the philosopher, 
appears in philosophical discourse in own sense and religious discourse in 
an allegorical sense. What is critical reason for Schopenhauer is that 
religious speech not explicitly confess its allegorical nature opting for the 
word "mystery" which is nothing more than a "tecnicus terminus" 
theological for religious allegory. According to the philosopher, the so-
called mysteries of the various theogonies are like "public dogmas" that the 
logical-rational perspective, can be considered absurd, but in many cases 
are absurd involving a sublime truth. A truth that the people could not 
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understand it was transmitted otherwise, for the vulgar lack speculative 
capacity and plenty of metaphysical necessity. The metaphysical need is 
met with allegories and myths. The myth and allegory form the key 
elements of religion serving the "mental myopia" satisfying and 
metaphysical necessity of ordinary men, thus facilitating access to truths 
and conceptions that the philosophical way they do not reach because they 
are unaccustomed to language and the philosophical abstraction. Religions 
can only teach us the truth mediately, the value of a religion depends on the 
more or less true containing its allegories. In this sense, for the philosopher 
of Frankfurt , the oldest religions are the most perfect . Buddhism and 
Brahmanism represent the highest creations of religious metaphysics. The 
criterion adopted by Schopenhauer that assessment takes into account 
mainly the ethical spirit of religions, despise the fact that they are 
polytheistic, monotheistic or atheists. More important to him is the ethical 
doctrine contained in religion, its position against the existence, the 
affirmation or denial of the will to live, which results in pessimism or 
optimism 
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Kant in the "Critique of Pure Reason," when talking about the table of 
categories says that a complete dictionary with all the explanations 
required, it is not only possible, but also easy to make. For this, prescribes a 
topical that he believes is easy to perform, since the divisions already exist, 
simply fill them. The philosopher concludes that the method hardly makes 
mistakes about the place each concept while easily indicates the place that 
is still empty.  
Develop "literally" this methodology; as recommended by Kant, 
this methodology may extract interesting observations that may have 
important implications regarding the scientific form of all knowledge of 
reason.    
In a plan consisting of two orthogonal axes are distributed by zones 
of neighborhood usual concepts in philosophy, theology and psychology. 
The axes represent two different and complementary dimensions and the 
ordering principle of this topology is the purpose (telos), which is able to 
assign each concept its place and function on the whole. Each concept 
refers to other concepts, because they are structurally linked in such a way 
as to constitute a plane of immanence in Deleuze's way.  
As Deleuze notes, there is a kind of teleology in conceptual 
weaving and the methodology that we developed from the Kantian 
prescription, turned into a topical of worldviews. This topical delineates 
four distinct fields where there are a kind of logical isomorphism with the 
square of Apuleius based on Aristotelian propositional logic. All 
assumptions valid for a diagrammatic model are also valid for the other. 
The same topology of worldviews, also defines the main views of the 
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transcendent, which are studied in metaphysics, philosophy of religion and 
theology. 
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The aim of my paper is to explain how Thomas Aquinas's views about 
logic and about power contribute to a defense of one traditional view of 
divine omnipotence, namely one according to which God can do all things 
that are possible absolutely—i.e., whatever does not imply a contradiction. 
In the contemporary literature on omnipotence, the traditional view just 
stated is interpreted as meaning that God is omnipotent if and only if God 
can realize any consistent state of affairs or, on an alternative construal, if 
and only if God can perform any consistent task. 
Accordingly, contemporary philosophers have raised several 
problems which can be divided into two sorts: (1) those according to which 
the notion of omnipotence is itself problematic and (2) those according to 
which omnipotence is incompatible with other divine attributes such as 
God's moral perfection. Regarding (1), it has been argued (Conee, 1991) 
that omnipotence entails the ability to realize impossible states of affairs. 
This opposes the traditional view, and stands in critique over it insofar as, 
for the traditional view, God's power is understood to be limited by logical 
consistency. Alternatively, it has been argued (Gale, 1991) that the notion 
of omnipotence entails a contradiction. Regarding (2) it has been argued 
(Morriston, 2001) that omnipotence and perfect moral goodness are 
incompatible since omnipotence entails that God can do something morally 
impermissible.  
Thomas conceives of a power (potentia) as principium actus—the 
principle (i.e., source) of an actuality. Powers have a directional character 
in that they aim at some actuality, which for Thomas is some form. Active 
powers, in particular, aim at perfections, those forms that contribute to the 
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being and excellence of a thing. In contrast to contemporary views, then, it 
is perfection, and not mere consistency, that is the object of divine power.   
I argue that Thomas's views on (i) contradiction, (ii) the truth of 
propositions, and (iii) predication, in conjunction with his account of 
power, can solve the sorts of problems mentioned above. Regarding (i), 
Thomas holds that contradictions are false because they fail to indicate. 
Regarding (ii), some true propositions treat as beings what are really non-
beings, principally negations and privations. And regarding (iii), 
predication can be equivocal and analogical.  
Given Thomas’s account of power and his views about logic, the 
Thomistic solution, in sum, is that some potencies turn out to be what I call 
‘fauxtencies’—false or pseudo powers. These are excluded from a proper 
conception of divine omnipotence. 
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In recent years there has been significant philosophical interest in the 
possibility and potential of non-classical logics; yet, the possibilities for 
philosophical argument that may be opened up by proposing ways of 
‘going beyond’ laws of classical logic such as the ‘Law of Non-
Contradiction’ have not yet been explored in connection with the 
fundamental questions of the philosophy of religion, such as that of God’s 
existence. Precisely these possibilities, however, are central in the thought 
of Nicolaus Cusanus, a Neoplatonism-influenced yet hard-to-categorize 
fifteenth-century philosopher-theologian, also recently enjoying significant 
scholarly attention, who in his De Docta Ignorantia (1438-1440) developed 
a philosophical method which makes systematic, positive use of paradox in 
order to derive knowledge about God. In my paper I will focus on what 
may be called his version of the ‘ontological argument’ and the 
philosophical method that underpins it (and which justifies it being 
characterized as ‘radically novel’ – not only in Cusanus’ contemporary 
context but, indeed, also in our own). 
 Cusanus formulates his ‘ontological argument’ in chapter VI of 
book I of De Docta Ignorantia (1438-1440), in consequence of the 
philosophical method he is developing. At its core is the notion of God as a 
fundamentally paradoxical object of thought. This may be explained by 
means of the notion of a ‘radically slippery’ object X: X is defined as being 
unnameable. The answer to the question of naming X can be formulated as 
an infinite series in which each successive step adds a negation of what was 
asserted at the previous step, since, due to X’s unnameability, no step can 
‘complete’ the series: 1) X is unnameable; 2) X is unnameable and X is 
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nameable; 3) X is unnameable and X is nameable and X is neither 
unnameable nor nameable; etc. Every assertion added at each of the steps, 
paradoxically, holds necessarily true about X. I thus formalize Cusanus’ 
method by defining it as the realization of a series of progressive stages: 
S1, S2, … Sn, Sn+1, … , each ‘Sn’ formulating a ‘coincidence of 
opposites’, i.e. a proposition that is a contradiction in the terms defined at 
the ‘Sn-1’ level. For Cusanus God is precisely such a ‘slippery object’ X, 
defined as infinite (and thus unnameable); his method of ‘learned 
ignorance’ (docta ignorantia) is a deduction moving through the successive 
stages. 
 It follows, on the question of God’s ‘existence’ (as yet another type 
of ‘name’), that it is necessarily true both that God exists and that God 
doesn’t exist; and that neither of these are true; and that this itself is false; 
etc. Cusanus argues throughout the treatise that this is no defeat for either 
theism or coherent argumentation: God’s necessary existence, together with 
his non-existence, etc., follow simply from the nature of the paradoxical 
object we are dealing with, of which nothing can be simply affirmed 
without also, implicitly, being denied—yet both hold true. An objector 
(such as was Johannes Wenck, Cusanus’ contemporary) will attempt to 
deny the legitimacy of any such paradox-filled reasoning. Yet, an advocate 
may argue the issue ultimately is: why should we avoid thinking 
systematically about such paradoxical objects? Cusanus argues such 
exercises in ‘non-classical’ logic are crucially useful and ultimately 
indispensable for an understanding of the Christian tradition (with its 
explicit layers of paradox: the Trinity, the Incarnation, etc.); and this can 
hold true of other religious traditions insofar as they make use of paradox. 
This opens up intriguing contemporary possibilities for common ground 
and dialogue. 
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In Christian philosophy and theology, there is a God who is one according 
to the essence (truth achieved by Reason and Revelation) and three 
according to the Persons (Revealed Truth), i.e. the only essence of divinity, 
in indivisible form, exists in three distinct persons: Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit. In the Latin tradition, the Persons are distinguished not by essence or 
substance, but by relations of origin (Generation and Procession 
simpliciter). A major point of disagreement between the Latin Church and 
the Greek Church, is that for the first, the Holy Spirit proceeds (“ex Patre 
Filioque procedit”) from the Father and the Son, while for the second, the 
Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father (“ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς 
ἐκπορευόμενον”) as the source of all processions. Such divergence, called 
the Filioque question, is present in the Latin and Greek versions of the 
Nicene Creed (Nicaea, 325; Constantinople, 381). Based on Canon VII of 
the Council of Ephesus (431), which declared anathema whoever made 
changes in the propositions laid down in the Council of Nicaea (including 
the Profession of Faith of the Creed), the Greek Church accused the Latin 
Church of heresy. Much discussion and controversy about the question of 
the Filioque occurred, along with other cultural and political issues, 
between the ninth and eleventh centuries, culminating in the Great Schism 
(1054). Regarding the question of the Filioque, the issue is due particularly 
to a semantic problem: Greeks and Latins do not interpreted in the same 
way the verb “to proceed”. For St. Thomas Aquinas, one can only 
understand the real relations in God, in which there are inner processions. 
For him, there are only two processions: the procession of the Word 
(processio verbi, as operation of the intellect, called Generation); and the 
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procession of love (amoris processio, as operation of the will). In each 
procession there are two opposite relations: the relation of a principle 
(Paternity and Spiration) and the relation of the term proceeding from a 
principle (Filiation and Passive Spiration) (cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 
XXVIII, a. 4). As the term “Person” means in this context, “the relation 
while reality subsisting in the divine nature” it follows that there are several 
Persons in God (idem, q. XXX, a. 2). But if there are four divine relations, 
how can there be only three Divine Persons? Paternity and Filiation are 
opposite relations, but (Active) Spiration  do not oppose them, because 
both Father and Son can satisfy it, assuming an affirmative position in the 
Filioque question. 
Concerning to the Filioque question, Aquinas answers whether the 
Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, in Summa Theologica I, Quaestio 
XXVI, articulus 2. My goal is to present a logical analysis of the concept of 
the Trinity in Aquinas and his proposed solution to the problem of the 
Filioque. I attempt to make a mathematical interpretation of the Aquinas’ 
concept of Triune God, via a system or relational structure in which it is 
logically necessary that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. 
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Since The Coherence of Theism Richard Swinburne has been defending a 
view about God’s necessity that parts company with that held by the 
majority of contemporary Christian philosophers. More recently, 
Swinburne has developed this view in greater detail and sophistication. 
According to this view, God is not a metaphysically necessary being, 
although He is “necessary in the sense that His existence is not causally 
contingent on anything else”(Swinburne, 2010). Swinburne defends that it 
is logically possible that “there is no God,” since no contradiction can be 
derived from some descriptions of a world without a God. And, as a result, 
we should conclude “(given S5) that it is logically necessary that it is not 
logically necessary that there is a God” (Swinburne, 2010), and, therefore, 
that God’s existence is logically contingent. In this paper I seek to explicate 
Swinburne’s views on God’s necessity and I do this in large part by 
comparing his position with that of Alvin Plantinga (Plantinga, 1974) and 
Brian Leftow (Leftow, 2010, 2012), two of the main defenders of the 
majority position among Christian philosophers, according to which God is 
a metaphysically necessary being.  
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Anthropic Principle was originally introduced by Brandon Carter in 1973 (Carter, 
1974) as a prediction tool in cosmology. Although Copernicus taught us we don't 
occupy a privileged central position in the Universe, in Carter's view this doesn't 
mean "that our position cannot be privileged in any sense". Following Dicke's 
work  (Dicke, 1961), Carter emphasizes the specificity of our position in the 
Universe given that specially favourable physical and chemical conditions that are 
prerequisite for our existence. Taking into account these conditions, Carter 
formulated what he called the anthropic principle stating that what we can expect 
to observe must be restricted by the conditions necessary for our presence as 
observers. Carter offered us two versions of the anthropic principle: the "weak" 
anthropic principle and the "strong" one. From then it has been proposed more 
than thirty different reformulations and interpretations of the original principle. 
As a result of this multiplicity the principle has given rise to confusion and 
controversy. It has been applied to several distinct ideas and it has been used with 
different purposes, including theological (at and the same time teleological) ones. 
May be the most known use given to anthropic principle has to do with the new 
sort of Creationism based on Intelligent Design supported by the argument from 
fine-tuning, in which the delicate connections among values of certain constants 
and law of physics is seen as evidence for taking the Universe as a result of a 
(Divine) purposeful creation versus just a fruit of mindless chance. The main 
criticisms against Carter's principles are of two types. These principles are taken 
alternatively as trivial or as too speculative. Carter's formulation of the weak 
anthropic principle has been often attacked for being merely a tautology and, 
therefore, inadequate for doing any interesting explanatory work.  The strong 
version has been often presented as very speculative and without any empirical 
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support. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to show that the "weak" anthropic 
principle has interesting non trivial readings and that the strong version has also 
interesting non purely speculative readings. Finally,  I use such distinctions  to try 
to show that  the reading of the "strong" anthropic principle used to build the 
theological arguments is not correct and, as a result, the arguments based on it 
suffer a fatal logical flaw. 
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Panpsychism is a powerful alternative to reductionism (or perhaps a 
doctrine implied by reductionism, as Galen Strawson said). Thomas Nagel 
in Mind and Cosmos has defended a form a panpsychism which is an 
alternative to dogmatic evolutionism. But, panpsychism suffers from two 
potential defects I will try to remedy partially.  
First the logical structure of panpsychism, conceived as a set of 
principles and derivations, is not very clear. Reductionism by contrast is 
much better exposed. It does not mean that reductionism is true, whereas 
panpsychism is false, but that the intuition behind panpsychism is very 
subtile and still asks for a precise and flexible formalization of its main 
arguments. In some sense, it is equivalent to give a rational version of 
panpsychism, besides poetic or mystical versions. One of the logical 
difficulties is the quantificational language we should use in order to 
capture the holistic aspect of panpsychism. I will use mereological 
formalism, because I think that psychism is a relatively occult metaphysics 
of the whole and the part.  
Second panpsychism, as far as it is far away from pantheism, does 
not imply a rough identity between what does exist and God. But as spirit is 
a prerogative of God and rational beings, to attribute the existence of spirit 
in non rational beings, could seem to be a move towards pantheism. But 
panpsychism does not imply the equivalence thesis between God and 
Nature (or whatever else). Panpsychism affirms that spirit or consciousness 
(it depends of the strength of panpsychism whether it is the first or the 
second) is a part of the natural process of mundane reality. In that sens it is 
opposed to emergentism which postulates a moment of bifurcation between 
the spiritual and the non spiritual. The sprit is a part of living organism, and 
it does not mean that the sprit (or the mind) emerges from organized life. 
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All that being said, we have to precise the relation between God and the 
spiritual and material structure of the world 
My paper will offer  a logical evaluation of panpsychism. If this 
doctrine could offer an alternative to dogmatic evolutionism, it would be a 
necessity that it will appear as rational and well established on clear 
principles. Logical activity could be understood as a part of the spiritual 
process itself. There is a mediation for this difficult task: recently somme 
philosophers (Jonathan Schaffer) have proposed a formal and logical 
defense of holism, the doctrine despised by Russell, and it could be a first 
step to decide if panpsychism is a variety of holism, and if the answer is at 
lest in part affirmative, use the discussion about holism in order to give a 
rational defense of panpsychism. 
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Could we frame some utters stem from conflicts of belief in the 
classrooms as moorean paradox type? Firstly, we will analyze the problem 
of the rationality of belief systems from the perspective of first-person 
authority, considering the putative production of contradictory statements 
by an individual when confronted with the interaction of different doxastic 
systems, in particular, religious and scientific ones. To do so, we will take 
as a starting point the classic problem of Moore’s paradox. Statements with 
the form ‘I know that p but do not believe in p” (Moore, 1942) constantly 
recur in debates about knowledge, belief, understanding, both in the 
educational and the philosophical literature (Green and Williams, 2007), 
with slight polysemous variations regarding the term “know”. We will see, 
however, that these variations are not trivial, but, on the contrary, can be 
shown to be central to the treatment of the problem at stake. It will be 
important to bear always in mind that when we refer to the discussion about 
the rationality of a given doxastic system, we are dealing with what is at 
stake when such a system enters in open contact with other doxastic 
systems in schools, universities, religious institutions, etc. We will focus, 
moreover, on cases in which this contact can indeed lead to conflicts. We 
should stress that schools are particularly significant environments when it 
comes to opportunities for different thought traditions and worldviews to 
enter into contact (El-Hani and Mortimer, 2007). These situations can be 
quite challenging for different beliefs and thinking styles. 
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We develop an argument of a manuscript circulated some under the title If 
Some Property is not Divine then God Exists from 1998 which made it 
so dated to the discussion and bibliography of (Fuhrmann 2005). The result 
of said manuscript was indicated at the end of (Bjørdal 1999): “By making 
use of a result of Petr Hajek (see (Hajek1996)), which he made me aware of 
at the Liblice-conference, and presupposing certain recursive definition-
clauses for divine (positive) and Godly being, we may show that even Ax. 2 
is eliminable if we presuppose a reasonable second order comprehension 
principle for the predicate Godly being.... I hope to be able to publish this 
improved result, alongside with certain remarks, in a future paper.''  
Recently (Bjørdal1999) received favorable attention from 
Christoph Benzmüller and Bruno Woltzenlogel-Paleo. The manuscript 
evolved and I just found version (Bjørdal 2011) which with other work is 
superseded by considerations below and forthcoming. 
  As pointed out in (Belnap & Gupta 1993) p. 194, seemingly circular 
definitions may be appropriately inductive and circularity (though not 
impredicativity, of course) avoided by higher order machinery; the 
particular definitional scheme referred to loc.cit. may as verified in (Gupta 
2012) be simplified so that if H occurs positively in A(x,H) we can define 
Jx by ∀K(∀y(A(y,K) Ky) Kx)) and show that ∀x(Jx↔A(x,J)) under 
standards assumptions. Presuppose a second order modal logic and define 
divine property as D(F)≙ ∀x(Gx Fx) and Godly being as 
Gx≙∀Y(D(Y) Yx); by substitution, Gy↔∀Y( ∀x)(Gx Yx) Yx).  
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Following (Bjørdal 2012), the second order definition must be 
Gx↔∀H(∀y(∀Y( ∀z(Hz Yz) Yy) Hy) Hx) and all S5 principles 
used; if we disregard the modal operator the complexity is perhaps as low 
as Π1/1 and at most Π1/3 (for a discussion, see the recent A Question 
Related to the Formula Hierarchy on MathOverflow), so full second order 
modal logic is not needed. Given the induced definitions of divine property 
and Godly being, a theorem is that the following thesis is derivable in an 
appropriate second order modal logic S5: 
 
The Divine Thesis ∀XD(X)∨∃xGx 
 
Proofoutline: first derive the biconditionals as by the formal 
definitions of divine property and Godly being above from the second order 
definition of Gx above by adapting (Bjørdal 2012); then adapt the argument 
of (Bjørdal 2011). 
Note that a least fixed point is atheist, and that there may be theistic 
ones. If there is a God and being identical with a God is a divine property, 
monotheism is true. Gaunilo-like objections fade, here, as does the 
objection by (Oppy1996) that arbitrary properties may be substituted. 
Certainly there are niceties concerning the machinery which deserve more 
attention than can be given here, and I do not commit to its superiority. 
Nevertheless, standard model theoretic considerations apply and offer no 
obstacles. 
An apathiatheistic remark is that the best concepts of 'God' are such 
that the question as to whether there is a God or not is academic in a sense 
similar to the question as to whether there are holes or just holed things. 
The confidentialistic remarks are inter alia that the most important religious 
question is not whether there is a God rather whether something ultimately 
rectifies the unsayable sufferings of some (and others, for metaphysical 
parity), or not, and that the latter question has an affirmative answer.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
BJØRDAL, F. 1999. Understanding Gödel's Ontological Argument, in 
 
88 Handbook of the 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion 
Timothy Childers (ed.) The LOGICA Yearbook 1998, pp. 214-217,  
FILOSOFIA. 
BJØRDAL, F. 2011. If Some Property is not Divine then God exists, 
circulated some. 
BJØRDAL, F. 2012. Divine Comprehension, slightly circulated 
manuscript. 
FUHRMANN, A. 2005. Existenz und Notwendigkeit – Kurt Gödel's 
Axiomatische Theologie, in Olsson e.J., Schröder-Heister, P. and 
Spohn, W. (eds.) Logik in der Philosophie, pp. 349-374, Synchr.-
Wissenschafts-Verlag. 
GUPTA, A. 2012. Solution to Bjørdal's Problem, private email 
communication. 
GUPTA, A. and Belnap, N. 1993. The Revision Theory of Truth, the MIT 
Press. 
HAJEK, P. 1996. Magari and others on Gödel's Ontological  Proof, in 
Ursini et alii (eds.) Logic and Logical Algebra, pp. 125-136, Marcel 
Dekker. 
OPPY, G. 1996. Gödelian Ontological Arguments, in Analysis, 56(4) pp. 
226-230.  
 
 
 
  
 
89 Abstracts 
GASPAR DE SOUZA 
 
LOGIC AND THE NATURE OF GOD 
A study of God's logical nature in Protestant Tradition 
 
Philosophical Theology, Andrew Jumper Presbyterian Graduate Center, 
Brazil 
profgaspardesouza@gmail.com 
 
In the philosophy of religion, hardly has given attention to the nature of 
logic and its relationship with the nature of God. In general, the writings 
focus on the question of logical consistency between God and his attributes, 
such as Omnipotence. See, for example, the book by Stephen T. Davis 
Logic and the Nature of God. There, the author explains that the title 
indicates only “that I intend to subject the notion of God to rigorous 
philosophical analysis; and second, that my method in the book will 
primarily be that of analytic philosophy of religion rather than, say, biblical 
or dogmatic theology”(Davis, 1983). Thus, Davis does not evaluate the 
relationship between logic and the nature of God indeed. In the Christian 
tradition older, Thomas Aquinas and Rene Descartes gave some attention 
to this relationship. Of them, two positions emerged. The first claims that 
the logical consistency was only the necessary condition for the divine 
omnipotence. The logical limit the power of God. The second position 
claims that logic pertains only to the world created by God, while he 
himself is not subject to such laws (Nash, 1999). 
 The Protestant tradition also investigated the relationship between 
Nature and Logic of God, especially the Reformed tradition, also known as 
Calvinist. In this tradition, the investigation of logic and the nature of God, 
with emphasis on the law of non-contradiction, involves the absoluteness of 
God, Augustinian heritage, or according to ideas of John Calvin, “who 
vigorously articulated the Creator-creature distinction”. This Calvinist 
Protestant Tradition considers the need for a “distinctiveness of the 
Christian approach to logic”, or “the necessity for a Christian logic” 
(Poythress, 2013).  
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 I shall attempt to present in this paper the existence of a Calvinist 
theistic conception of logic that follows from the understanding of God's 
nature in its absoluteness, and its relationship with Creation. At the 
foundation of this conception is an epistemological distinction that theists 
and non-theists have different views of Logic. According to the Protestant 
Tradition Calvinist, logic neither work independent of God nor the logic is 
just “there”. But the logic or is based on the nature of God, or reflects the 
thinking of God analogically. Thus, there is also a metaphysical 
relationship between the Nature of God and the Logic – because God exists 
necessarily the laws of logic exist; and also an epistemological relationship 
between the Nature of God and the Logic – because God created humans in 
his image and likeness, they reflect the mind of God analogically. 
According to Poythress (Logic, 2013), “our logic reflects God's logic. 
Logic, then, is an aspect of God's mind. Logic is universal among all 
human beings in all cultures, because there is only one God, and we are all 
made in the image of God.” 
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In Sept, 1998  Pope John Paul II issued his encyclical on Faith and Reason., 
a topic not formally address in an encyclical since Aeterni Patris, by Leo 
XIII in1879,  Fides et Ratio commences by addressing  the proper roles of 
faith and reason on man's path to truth and  then explains how faith and 
reason  compliment and support one another with complete 
compatibility.  Shortly after its publication, the Pope explained in an 
address to some American Bishops his motive.  He "wished to defend the 
capacity of human reason to know the truth. This confidence in reason is an 
integral part of the Catholic intellectual tradition, but it needs reaffirming 
today in the face of widespread and doctrinaire doubt about our ability to 
answer the fundamental questions: Who am I? Where have I come from 
and where am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this 
life?"   The Pope went on to claim that “The violent history of this century 
is due in no small part to the closure of reason to the existence of ultimate 
and objective truth. The result has been a pervasive skepticism and 
relativism, which have not led to a more 'mature' humanity but too much 
despair and irrationality" cf.,Ad Limina Address of October 24, 1998, n. 5. 
This paper will argue that Fides et Ratio reflects a “modern” 
paradigm and hermeneutical perspective, which has mostly dominated 
Christianity since the 16
th
 century. In this sense, Fides et Ratio represents a 
mature and long “traditional” understanding of the relationship between 
logic, reason and faith (religion).  However, this modern paradigm has been 
seriously during the last half decade and given rise to the emerging “Post 
Modern” paradigm.  Within the Post Modern paradigm, one detects 
different understandings of truth, reason, God, ethics and religion.  The 
religiosity of the young adults in Post Modernity, sometimes called 
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Moralistic Therapeutic Deism (cf., Soul Searching: The Religious and 
Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers (2005), Christian Smith) expresses 
in embryonic form key religious beliefs rooted in a different logic and 
rationality.  
The paper will unfold in three stages.  Part one of the paper will 
highlight how Fides et Ratio portrays reason in relationship to faith.  Part 
two will outline how Post Modernity contrasts with Modernity, especially 
in its understanding of reason.  Part three will present the “creed” of 
Moralistic Therapeutic Deism as an example of how faith and reason are 
appearing in Post Modernity. 
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What does "God" mean for Wittgenstein? This question is fascinating, 
leading along divergent paths, and therefore to no one answer. 
Wittgenstein’s writings contain many expressions that suggest enigmatic 
tensions (Malcolm, 1993). Is he a pantheistic? (BARRETT, 1994); Is he a 
mystic? (Margutti Pinto, 1998); Is he a atheist? (Grayling, 1996). 
 In order to understand Tractatus's treatment of the concept of God 
we need to look at a aspect of the so-called picture theory of the 
proposition, in particular, at the distinction between saying and showing 
(Tejedor, 2011). According to this theory, propositions picture the world, 
and thus accurately represent it. In this case, the language is used to say 
only a variety of possible states of affairs - possible ways in which reality 
could be. However, the most important things in life, such as God, ethics, 
religion, aesthetics and the like are simply things that should be shown. 
They lie outside the world, and they are not a part of the world like a fact. 
Thus, to say that Wittgenstein denies the existence of God is simply wrong. 
For him, God cannot be contained within the boundaries of language; it lies 
beyond the logical space of our language.  
 This Communication aims to present the relation between the logic 
and the concept of God in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Exposing the idea that 
God is conceived from the framework imposed by Pictorial Theory, which 
are characterized in the logical-linguistic constraints arising from the 
critique of language held by the young Wittgenstein. Therefore, lies the 
logic and the concept of God in the specific context of the show, and 
analyzes the relationship between them. 
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Concerning the classical problem of evil, one of the main questions regards 
the compatibility between the infinitely good will of God and the quantity 
of evil in the world. Among the possible solutions to the problem of evil, 
one proposed is the existence of a free will inherent to mankind that would 
justify evil and suffering as derived from the inappropriate use of human 
freedom. This possibility is defended by many philosophers through history 
- Augustine, for example, asserts that “a wanton will is the cause of all 
evils” (Augustine, 2010). 
Considering free will on its moral aspect, we can propose the 
question in another way: “Why does God, in His infinite goodness, allow 
free beings to commit this enormous quantity of evil?” Alvin Plantinga, in 
his book “God, freedom, and evil”, argues that God could have created a 
world without moral evil simply by not creating significantly free beings, 
and that God could only diminish such quantity of evil by suppressing the 
human free will. So, he claims about God’s ability to create a world in 
which there was less moral evil but as much quantity of good as in ours, 
thus concluding that it would be illogical (Plantinga, 1977). 
The same author presents a brief critic to the human ability of 
measure evil in our world. A more extensive discussion concerning this 
ability is presented by Peter van Inwagen, in his work “The problem of 
evil” (Van Inwagen, 2006).  The philosopher claims that questionings about 
quantity of evil suppose that God could fulfil his intentions without 
allowing an excessive quantity of evil, defending the consistency of any 
quantity of evil with God's plan - what is known as “no-minimal claim”. 
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Thereby, van Inwagen argues that, due to human free will, if God 
allows some amount of evil, it could not be null, because then there would 
be no freedom of choice. Therefore, this quantity is either determined or 
undetermined. Through a line of reasoning that considers these two 
possibilities in relation to the quantity of evil, he concludes that the creation 
of free beings implies necessarily that evil is impossible to be quantified 
(Rovira, 2010). Some authors question the validity of van Inwagen’s no-
minimal claim argument, associating the indeterminacy of quantifying evil 
to the limits of human perception, while others notice that there are no 
limits for God on creating in ourselves sufficient perception to notice evil 
(Cullison, 2011). 
Our goal is to present succinctly a logical analysis of the arguments 
and the solutions to the question of quantity of moral evil, in the way 
proposed by Plantinga and van Inwagen. 
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The issue of immanence and transcendence of God is crucial for religious 
thought.  One reason that it never gets settled is that it has so many 
meanings and turns up in so many different contexts.  A view that 
emphasizes immanence in one context may emphasize transcendence in 
another.  What the terms mean depends in part on the metaphysical 
assumptions, usually unconscious, of those who use them. According to 
Islamic Mysticism, these two mutually dependent sides must constantly be 
borne in mind, if the relationship between God and universe, Reality and 
appearance, is to be truly understood (Chittick,1989). It is because of 
nonexistence that God is described as transcendent (tanzīh), and because of 
existence that He is known as immanent (tashbīh). The first qualification is 
accomplished through the use of reason, whereas the second is made 
through the exercise of imagination. By employing both  faculties, reason 
and imagination, together properly, the mystic becomes "the one with two 
eyes," that is to say, someone with perfectly balanced vision. The two 
aspects of God, transcendence and immanence, are summarized by the 
Quranic verse "There is nothing like Him, and  He is the Hearer, the Seer" 
(Al-Hilali&Muhsin Khan,1990). The religion-historians and researchers 
and alongside them some mystics insist on it and according to it they 
consider the logic of the call as a function of the two-valued logic 
(transcendence or imanence). According to this logic one must classify the 
call of the divine prophets based on their emphasize upon the unity or 
plurality just in three categories of transcendental calls- similar calls and t-s 
calls and as a result consider the face of divine religions necessarily either 
transcendental or similar or T-I. I think the fuzzy logic and thought has in 
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understanding of propositions approaches paradoxes and in a general of any 
mystical explanation and analysis. 
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Fundamental attention to the causal relations between things has been one 
of the most important mental disturbances for philosophers and 
theologians, so as almost all of them devoted a part of their books 
separately to the Causality. This subject in the modern age, by raising the 
experimental sciences, placed in new road. In Islam too, by raising the 
thoughts of Molla Sadra in the form of Transcendent Philosophy, problem 
of Causality took a new meaning that one could not find in other Islamic 
philosopher. In this article we will survey the Descartes ҆s explanation of 
causality and that how far he is from the scholastic explanation in this 
subject. We also will study the Sadraean explanation of Causality and at the 
end; survey the differences and similarities between these two great 
philosophers in the discussion of Causality.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
BENNETT, Jonathan. 2001. Learning from Six Philosophers: Descartes, 
Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
TAD M. Schmaltz. 2008. Descartes on causation. Oxford University  Press. 
SCHMALTZ, Tad M. 1992a. Descartes and Malebranche on Mind and 
Mind-Body Union. Philosophical Review 101:281–325.  
 
 
 
  
 
100 Handbook of the 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion 
JACEK J. NOWAK 
 
AN OUTLINE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
SYSTEM OF NON-CONTRADICTORY REASONING IN 
HUMAN SCIENCES: K. REY’ APPLICATION TO 
INVESTIGATE THE PROPERTIES  OF MONOTHEISM 
 
Dept. of Management, The Bogdan Jański Academy in Warsaw, Poland 
jacek.nowak@janski.edu.pl 
 
The necessary feature of any professional text or reasoning, especially 
scientific and also religion text, is its logical correctness. 
But natural language is non-exact and often not univocal. Using 
such language in reasoning  may lead very often to contradictory 
statements. And this fact is one of the greatest barriers in human sciences to 
achieve the logical correctness of texts, especially religion ones. 
This paper outlines the elements of the theoretico-methodological 
foundations of the system of non-contradictory reasoning in human 
sciences. Its origins are based on principles or postulates and approaches, 
especially: principle of contradiction (Aristotle, 1996), Salamucha (a 
disciple of Jan Łukasiewicz) postulate of formalization of philosophical 
reasoning (Salamucha, 1997), Tarski notion of truth and those of L. 
Wittgenstein and B. Russell.  
In the paper it is outlined the K. Rey approach, called “Principia 
Humanistica” (Rey, 2009)  which is applied to constructing the theoretical 
foundations of the system of non-contradictory reasoning to investigate the 
properties of monotheism. 
  The described system of non-contradictory reasoning in human 
sciences consists of: 
1) special information language, called Mizar, similar to English 
language, but based on the principles and tools of the set 
theory and logic, 
2) computer checker of logical correctness of reasoning 
expressed in the language Mizar and additional elements of 
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three types constructing a theoretico-methodological basis for 
reasoning in human sciences. 
This theoretico-methodological basis for non-contradictory 
reasoning in human sciences is based on elements of following types: 
a) three general postulates formulated by K. Rey, 
b) so called Tarski/Wittgenstein/Russell rule – additional 
condition for truth – constructed by K. Rey and 
c) scientific facts of so-called related natural sciences, i.e. biology 
and especially neurophysiology of brain and endocrinology. 
Finally, there is showed how this system of non-contradictory 
reasoning in human sciences applied to investigate the properties of 
monotheism is provided with additional axioms of monotheism which are 
common to Mosaism, Christianity and Islam. 
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A consequence relation is called monotonic if for a set of premises Γ and 
sentences A, B, if Γ|-A, then ΓU{B1}|-A (read: if Γ entails A, then A will 
still be entailed by Γ no matter what we add to it); and nonmonotonic if 
there is some instance where this relation fails. A consequence of this is 
that in any system for which monotonicity holds, the body of claims 
provable from a set of premises can only increase as we add new claims to 
that premise set. 
By extension, we may call a body of knowledge monotonic if 
whatever is proven at an earlier stage remains proven at all later stages. 
Euclidean geometry is monotonic in this way: whatever is proven in the 
first book of the Elements remains so in the last. Physics, by contrast, is 
not. The laws of Newtonian mechanics, for instance, had to be curved once 
general relativity had been added to its stock of claims. 
From the 13
th
 century through the Reformation, theology behaves 
in the manner of a monotonic science. Concomitantly, to the degree that the 
argument first formulated by Anselm at Proslogion 2-5 is taken up by later 
commentators, it is accepted (e.g. Alexander of Hales, Duns Scotus, 
Descartes, Leibniz) or rejected (e.g. Thomas Aquinas) in accordance with 
the aims of a monotonic ideal: either its status as a proof, along with what it 
proves to be the case, are eternal and indefeasible, or the proof is no proof 
at all. 
In this paper, I argue that in contrast with almost the whole of its 
subsequent reception, Anselm himself embeds his famous argument in 
Proslogion 2-4 in a nonmonotonic context. In order to show this, I examine 
Anselm's use of chiasm in the Proslogion as a whole, and in particular the 
different the ways the notion “that than which nothing greater can be 
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thought” shows up in the work: a quite simple argument shows that if this 
weren’t so, Anselm would be contradicting himself when, in the middle of 
the treatise, he adds that God is greater than can be thought. The results 
found in this case should challenge us to reconsider some deeply ingrained 
ideas governing the historiography of the long 12
th
 century, particularly 
those concerning how the character of theology in the later 11
th
/12
th
 century 
relates to the scholasticism of the 13
th
. 
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William Lane Craig (1979) presented what has become the standard 
formulation of the kalām cosmological argument for the existence of God: 
 1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. 
 2. The universe began to exist. 
 3. Therefore, the universe had a cause of its existence. 
Since then, premise 2 has received particular scrutiny, and here I 
respond to one type of challenge to a common argument for premise 2, 
which I call the Impossible Formation Argument (IFA). The (IFA) is based 
on the mathematical intuition that it is impossible to form a set with 
infinitely many finite members by successive finite addition of finite 
members and concludes that, since any present moment would complete an 
infinite set by finite addition, the past cannot be infinitely old.  
Critics contend that the (IFA) presupposes a finite starting point 
and, thereby, begs the question against those who allow that the universe 
might be infinitely old (Mackie 1982, Smith 1987, Oppy 1991, Morriston 
2003) I argue that extant formulations of (IFA), such as that defended by 
Craig (1984),  are ambiguous in ways that invite the criticism. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the extant criticisms of the (IFA) fail because 
they presuppose uncharitable interpretations of (IFA) and that the (IFA) can 
be disambiguated in a way that avoids the objection. I conclude by 
constructing a disambiguated (IFA) and arguing that, holding fixed three 
assumptions—that time is dynamic, that temporal moments are discrete, 
and that sets are defined by a principle of constitution—it is logically 
impossible for the past to be infinitely old. On the assumption of an infinite 
past, standard transfinite mathematics entails a set with an infinitieth 
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member. But since standard transfinite mathematics also rejects the concept 
of an infinitieth member, we are faced with a contradiction. If this is right, 
and if these assumptions hold, at least one supporting argument for premise 
(2) of the kalām argument remains plausible.  
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In his treatise called De Trinitate (‘On the Trinity’), Augustine aims to 
demonstrate to his readers –among which are critics of the Nicene Creed– 
that God is Triune: “[...] we will undertake to render, as far as we are able, 
that very account which they so importunately demand: viz., that the Trinity 
is the one and only and true God, and also how the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit are rightly said, believed, understood, to be of one and the same 
substance or essence (De Trin., I, 2, 4). It is patent in the above excerpt that 
the African bishop not only want your reader seeing how one can believe 
what is said, but also to understand the issue of the Trinity, which implies 
that Augustine is aware that his thesis is not only a meaningless statement, 
but something intelligible, which is what interests us in this work. As he says 
later, “they are not three Gods, but one God: although the Father hath 
begotten the Son, and so He who is the Father is not the Son; and the Son is 
begotten by the Father, and so He who is the Son is not the Father; and the 
Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father 
and of the Son, Himself also co-equal with the Father and the Son, and 
pertaining to the unity of the Trinity.” (De Trin., I, 4, 7). Here we see that, 
besides the unity and trinity of God, the three persons have relations in the 
unity of the Trinity. Is it logically possible to demonstrate that God is 
simultaneously one essence and three persons without contradiction? In this 
sense, we aim to analyze logically the argument of Augustine in regard to 
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simultaneous unity and trinity of God, and in the relations between the 
Persons in that unity. In the second part of the treatise (Books VIII to XV), 
Augustine affirms he will proceed “modo interiore” (De Trin., VIII, 
Prologue, 1), because he will show images of the Trinity in the “inner man”. 
One of these images can be found in the mens (‘mind’, ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’); that 
is, the triad of memory, understanding and will, which are one and three at 
the same time, as demonstrated by Augustine: “For I remember that I have 
memory and understanding, and will; and I understand that I understand, and 
will, and remember; and I will that I will, and remember, and understand; and 
I remember together my whole memory, and understanding, and will.” (De 
Trin., X, 11, 18). This means that a faculty of the mind does not happen 
without the other. At this point one may ask: Is there a same underlying logic 
in the argument that God is Triune and in His image in the human mind? In 
other words, this analogy implies a structural  isomorphism between the 
Trinity and the triad of memory, understanding and will, considering their 
respective relations? To discuss these issues, we will use the resources of the 
mathematical logic and of the theory of systems, where system is understood 
as a relational structure. 
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For experimental science and even speculative, questioning is the first 
condition of the method, which is the essential condition for formulating 
questions correctly that should be resolved. However, questioning 
according to the scientific method is not a very frequent when it comes to 
doctrinal content. 
Unlike the current stereotype of delay attributed to Islamic thought, 
during what has been termed the golden age of Islam, between the centuries 
IX and XII after Christ, i.e. between the III and VI centuries of Hijra, speak 
of Islamic thought in Al Andaluz, the caliphate of Spain, is talking about 
major advances. 
The term "theory of double truth" - قة مزدوجة ي ق ح  Al Raqiqa) ال
mujdeuza) is the most widely used to identify the attempt of philosopher 
hispano-Arab Averroes to articulate the divine revelation contained in the 
Koran sacred and the logical conclusions that came through philosophical 
reflection. 
In his book "The decisive speech on the continuity between the law 
and wisdom", Averroes says that "interpretation - ير س ف ت  (attafssir) ال
means the extension of the meaning of an expression of the real 
metaphorical".  According to this definition, the sacred texts can have two 
meanings: the clear and the occult. The reason for this double meaning is in 
the diversity of people and the difference of their natural tendencies with 
respect to the consent. The theory of Averroes has two logics: The logic of 
the crowd - شد ح  al rashid) and the logic of the man of science, the well) ال
founded in science - لوم ع ي ال برره ف  iuberirurm fi ialuum).  The first is) ي
the logic of induction and the second the logic of the syllogism. 
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It has become very widespread in medieval understanding of the 
sacred text has multiple meanings. In Summa Theologiae, São Tomas de 
Aquino presents the debate: "Art. 10 In Sacred Scripture the same letter has 
several meanings: the historical or literal, the alegório, Scripture or moral 
and anagogical." Aquino raises as first argument contrary to the existence 
of the various senses the possibility of confusion and deception generated 
this multiplicity. This counter-argument seems to agree with the logic of 
Gotlob Frege that demand write a language ambiguous or with the 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus. 
An example of different interpretations for the same text according 
to a logical and religious language or second logic and scientific language 
can indicate that the notion of the existence of multiple senses true in a 
same writing lead to a more comprehensive understanding and wisdom. 
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Some of the most interesting and non-trivial interpretation techniques for 
reading sacred texts try to expose or manifest the text's  poly-contextuallity, 
multi-level or multi-narrative structure and, consequently, several possible 
alternative readings. The intrepid explorer can then try to use such readings 
as threads (or as Ariadne's clews, or clues)  in the labyrinths of implicit 
meaning, in hope of not  loosing himself in his or her way to, in and out of 
paradise.  
  In this article, we explore some interpretation techniques for 
biblical texts exhibiting  linguistic phenomena known as the rhetorical 
figures of  paronomasia and syllepsis. Some traditional analyses look at 
these phenomena as: (1) Mere displays of stylistic wit using fancy 
rhetorical artifices; (2) Relics of archaic magical practices trying to  
manipulate occult powers of language; (3) Hints for hidden meanings to be 
deciphered using the rational and sophisticated tools of Talmudic 
hermeneutics. We contest all of the above (at least as exclusive and 
sufficient) explanations:  (1) looks far too shallow; (2) appears to be out of 
place in modern religion; and  (3) seems too detached from a lively 
religious experience (at least for a non expert).   
 Furthermore, we explore some alternatives that give (in our view) a 
more natural or genuine role for the phenomena at hand.  These alternatives 
are based in two principles:   
(A) Syntactic Rules based on the traditional rhetoric figures of 
paronomasia, syllepsis, and similar pun-like word plays.   
(B) Linkage Mechanisms  able to establish meaningful semantic 
connections using tolls that do not employ or depend on fully 
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developed linguistic skills or the ability (from listeners or from 
speakers of sacred texts) to use complex narrative structures.   
 Finally, although our view of the role played by paronomasia and 
syllepsis in biblical text is incompatible with the traditional ones listed 
above, it can explain some of their perceived successes. For example, it can 
explain why communication at a subconscious level, easily enabled by 
principles (A) and (B), can be perceived as supernatural magic. This 
approach can also offer novel explanations for some distinctive 
characteristics of Talmudic logic. For exam-ple, it offers alternative (and 
direct) explanations for unusual (in modern logic) non-transitive 
compositionality rules imposing a finite and very short range upon 
inference chains used at ritual law exegesis, see (Abraham et al., 2009) and 
(Franks, 2012). As an illustration, this approach is applied to the biblical 
verses of Amos 7:5-8, and Genesis 32:29-32. See (Casano-wicz, 1892), 
(Jaynes, 2000), (Klitsner, 2006) and (Noegel, 2013).      
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Some Muslim scholars, especially those interested in Philosophy and 
Logic, consider the Movement of translating the foreign (western) books 
and introducing them into the Islamic World to be one of the major factors 
that led to changes in the Islamic Societies. That is clearest in the scope of 
the "Islamic Doctrine". That occurred when a number of scholars, in the 
third Hegira century, started to use Logic and some Greek Philosophical 
points of view to explain aspects of Doctrine. 
 That Movement had no connection to the Doctrine at its beginning; 
it mainly focused on translating pure sciences (Ibn al-Nadim, 1978). Yet, 
later it interfered into the Doctrine and kindled a big doctrinal controversy 
in the third Hegira century and what followed. 
 This case resulted in a dispute among the religious scholars. 
Contributed to that storm were many of the Muslim Philosophers, who 
were accused of deviation from the teachings of Islam (Ameen, 1997) 
 Hence, this study/research aims to inquire into that controversial 
case that started early in the Islamic History. The study/research will 
further strive to discuss the motives that led to that argument that, in turn, 
resulted in religious provisions. These provisions, as well, became the 
subject of academic studies, centuries later. 
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Translation of the books of Logic during Islamic ages had a great effect on 
some Islam scientists through critical thinking, inductive methodology and 
comparison mechanisms between confessions and thoughts of those is the 
critical scientist, Andalusian Ibn Hazm – born in the late tenth century AC 
– search will focus on accentuating the effect of Logic on him as a model 
of one of Islam scientists who influenced by Logic in their classifications 
and inductive methodology, it also will handle some of important 
authoresses of his in which the effect of Logic looked clear in the terms of 
his use of making up tools such as the book of “Sects and Creeds” and “Al 
Ihkam fi Osol Al Ahkam” in the science of principles of Jurisprudence. 
The methodology followed in this Research will be deductive 
methodology; search also aims at accentuating the effect of Logic on the 
classifications of Islam scientists and showing that taking care of the 
science of Logic and making use of its tools has a positive effect on 
inductive methodology and discussions , Research will summarize results 
of which are that Logic has a non-disregarded effect on making up and 
classifying and that Logic is one of machine sciences that can be useful but 
with its shariah rules that Islam scientists complied  with to make use of the 
science of Logic.    
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Mathematical reflection principles play an important role in contemporary 
set theory. They are intrinsically motivated. These motivational arguments 
follow a pattern of reasoning that has its roots in the Judeo-Christian 
theological tradition. These latter arguments start from the negative premise 
of the transcendence of God: there is no defining condition in any human 
language that is satisfied by Him and by Him alone. From this it follows 
that if we can truly ascribe a property to God, this property must hold of 
some entity that is different from God as well. This conditional positive 
statement can justly be called a first theological reflection principle. This 
argument can be strengthened if we assume the stronger negative premise 
that not even an infinite body of humanly describable conditions 
characterise God uniquely. This means that there must be an entity that is 
different from God and that satisfies all properties that can be truly ascribed 
to God. This then is a second theological reflection principle. This latter 
principle was clearly articulated by Philo of Alexandria. 
The first theological reflection principle is the exact analogue of 
Bernays’ second-order (or class theoretic) reflection principle. The second 
reflection principle is the analogue of a relatively new class of (set 
theoretically very strong) class reflection principles, which are known as 
the Global Reflection Principles. The respective motivations for these set 
theoretic reflection principles are also analogous. In the foundational 
literature they are called richness arguments.  
In my contributed paper I will explore the analogy between these 
theological and class theoretical reflection principles. 
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In this paper, we will respond to two objections to Pascal’s Wager. The 
first is Sober and Mougin’s version of the “many gods objection”-- that 
there are many more possible gods offering infinite rewards and 
punishments than the one that Pascal mentions (Sober and Mougin, 1994). 
The second is Hájek’s “mixed strategy” objection. Hájek claims that the 
wager is invalid because every decision includes a positive probability that 
one will eventually come to believe in God and therefore, every decision 
has an infinite expected value (Hájek, 2003). We will argue that one can 
address both objections using a single strategy that expresses the infinite 
utilities in Pascal’s Wager as finite utilities per unit of time experienced 
over an infinite amount of time. Then, they can be ranked by looking at the 
ratio of the utility per unit of time between the religions as the length of 
time approaches infinity. We conclude by adding that other factors can also 
be included in the calculation, such as the probability that the religion is 
true, ease of conversion, and whether the religion allows you to hedge your 
bets by continuing to research other religions.  
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Is very well known the discussion, concerning Hume`s philosophy, if there 
is a role played by a especial being with extraordinary attributes, like a 
christian God; or if the Hume`s position on that debate is related with a 
atheism position.  
The formers ascribe the Scottish philosopher as a deist concerning 
religion (Gaskin, 1988), because Hume would not deny the existence of 
God, but only present some limits to that investigation; the laters ascribe 
him as a atheist (Russell, 2008), based on the fact that Hume`s naturalism 
and skepticism conduce to a Godless philosophy, following the hobbesian 
pathway of atheism, as presented by Paul Russell.  
This paper want to offer some elements to contribute to underlie the 
atheism position trying to show that, especially on Design Argument 
(Hume, 1990[1779], Parts II to V), that commonly is describe as a non 
conclusive argument against the existence of a especial Being (Gaskin, 
1988), Hume, evoking the principle of Parsimony in the Part XII of 
Dialogues (Hume, 1990[1779]) and due to Book II, Part I, Section 3 of A 
Tretise (Hume, 1985[1739-1740]), is trying to recognise that there is no 
possibility of a existence of a God, once that 1) there is no rationality on the 
explanation about the world`s creation and its order that necessitate a ex 
mundi cause of that existence; 2) there is no proportionality concerning 
God`s attribute and world`s characteristics, so 3) God is useless, not only to 
explain, but to maintain and bring to existence the natural world, once that 
is not necessary to multiply the entities to fulfill the explanation of nature, 
owing to Parsimony principle. (Monteiro, 2009). 
In that sense, Hume is asseverating that a naturalism explanation 
about causes and the origins of the natural world is complete and simplest 
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when it lies on natural principles, denying, in such a way, any importance 
and necessity to a Supreme Being with extraordinary attributes - like the 
christian one -, to strengthen his natural philosophy, which, in this regard, 
do not allow a possibility to assume God`s existence not even as possible.   
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In our paper, based on the views of Iranian contemporary philosopher and 
theologian, Morteza Motahari, We’re going to answer the question of 
whether the axiomatic account of Islam as one of the possible accounts, is 
justified or not? In fact, efforts to achieve this idea mean that we can 
present the rational and understandable account of Islam according to 
logical criteria. 
At first, examine the possibility of this account: Islam as an 
axiomatic system. This epistemological system has its own especial limited 
axioms and its postulates are countable. The next essential matter is this: 
other propositions can be inferred by using of the specified rules of 
inference and axioms and postulates (Tarski, 1994). Then, we will talk 
about this question: What are the rules of inference of this epistemological 
system? Are they limited to the rules of deduction or inference of 
commands or Secondary articles of faith of Islam from the principles of 
Islam, requires to going beyond the common rules of deductive axiomatic 
systems and use of analogic inferences? 
Islam, In Motahari's perspective, can be considered as an axiomatic 
system. Presented statements which were formed and born in the context of 
Islam show that the first necessary condition for being a Muslim is a 
rational acceptance of axioms of Islam rather than the piety or prejudiced 
acceptance and likewise, consciously commitment to the postulates must 
add to the previous condition (Motahari, 1989). Commands and secondary 
articles of faith of Islam like inferenced theorems within an axiomatic 
system, must have been consistency with the axioms and postulates 
(Motahari, 1987, 1988, 1994). Thus, according to Motahari’s paradigm 
until rational acknowledgment of axioms does not happen, a person is not a 
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Muslim, and as a logical result any step and any process to faithfully live 
become impossible .(Motahari. 1989, 2006).  
In addition, it can be argued that the ideas of Motahari have key 
features of the axiomatic system, these features can reconstruct in the 
system of religion beliefs. Finally we can say the corresponding between 
religion principles and axioms of an axiomatic system and also providing 
axiomatic approach to religion principles is possible. 
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Taking a lead from an argument by Robert Kenny (Kenny, 2006), I present 
the case that concepts of disembodied minds fail to refer, that is, to have 
actual intentional contents. Theistic discourse, grounded in the belief of 
irreducible unstructured minds, is described as engaging in systematic 
error. 
The argument is intended more widely as a defeater of any thesis 
that involves disembodied agency or mental processes (substance dualism, 
deism, etc), vindicating metaphysical naturalism, if successful. 
I assume the truth of certain theoretical hypotheses from research 
programs of embodied cognition (Shapiro, 2011). More broadly, the truth 
of a sufficiently bland characterization of concept empiricism (Prinz, 2002; 
Weiskopf, 2007) and more specifically, the truth of conceptual metaphor 
theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Lakoff, 2008). 
The conventional route taken by conceivability arguments that 
attempt to draw an inference from epistemic to alethic possibility adopts 
‘conceivability’ as a property of propositions (Yablo, 1993; Chalmers, 
2002). I criticize this as empirically inadequate and reframe 
‘conceivability’ as a relation between content and cognitive system. 
Under this framework, the metaphorical structure of several 
concepts of mind and their bodily basis are explored, including accounts of 
divine minds by philosophers of religion (Moreland, 2008). Given the 
etiology and nature of the content of mental concepts, conceptions of 
disembodied minds, when thought by agents with referential intentions, are 
considered to be instances of cognitive contradictions. Cognitive 
contradictions are described as a type of performative contradiction of acts 
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of conception. 
Potential counterarguments and responses drawn from personal 
introspection, religious phenomenology and theological analogy and 
allegory are addressed, based on empirical results from cognitive science. 
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The main philosophical problems which arose with the new 
message of Christianity had been solved during four ages in the field of 
metaphysics. In the case of the problems of the Holy Trinity and Christ 
who has two natures (and two wills, what was discussed in 7th century) it 
was possible thanks to some subtle differentiations and such notions like 
the nature of something (physis), person/hypostasis, essence, substance and 
their precise meaning. However if we stay in the field of standard logic 
these problems are not so easy to explain. As far as the Holy Trinity is 
concerned at least three problematic formulas which describe it can be 
presented: 
(i) For P – “God”: Ǝ x1,x2,x3 x1≠x2≠x3 ∧ P(x1) ∧ P(x2) ∧ 
P(x3) ∧  Ǝ! y P(y) 
(ii) Ǝ x1,x2,x3,y  x1=y ∧ x2=y ∧ x3=y ∧ x1≠x2≠x3    (Boethius; 
cf. Cary, 1995) 
(iii) Ǝ x1,x2,x3,y <x1, x2, x3> = y ∧ x1 = y ∧ x2 = y ∧ x3 = y ∧ 
x1≠x2≠x3  
And in the case of Christ's two natures problem (cf. Council of 
Chalcedon, 451; Morris, 1986) the following problematic formula can be 
considered: 
(iv) For P – “Christ”, Q – “The Second Divine Person”, R – 
“Christ-man”: ∀ x,y,z (P(x) ∧ Q(y) ∧ R(z) → x=y ∧ x=z ∧ 
y≠z) 
Of course all these four formulas need some comment, especially 
(i). However, each of them generates contradiction. There are some 
approaches that may help to avoid it. (1) In the cases ii–iv we can assume 
that the operator “=” may not signify a standard identity, in order to 
describe some non-simetric-identification; we could also consider 
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Leśniewski's epsilon instead of “=”, however, according to Leśniewski's 
axiom, 'ε' seems not to meet this requirement (Leśniewski, 1931), so some 
another “is” operator should apply here; in the cases (ii) and (iv) it seems 
that the exclusion of transition from the properties of this operator seems 
enough. (2) We can also introduce some new operators which represent 
some metaphysical relations, as Gödel did in the formalisation of the proof 
of the God's existence by defining “ess” operator; for example a “person” 
operator (x is a person of y).  (3) Furthermore, we can admit that all those 
four formulas are some serious logical exceptions. Hence, in this case we 
can speak about local logics, a bit looser than the standard one which is 
basically the framework for thinking about material world, and call them 
respectively: “the logic of Trinity” and “Christ-logic”. However I  think 
that the attempts (1) and (2) lead to such logics as well. According to some 
meanings of the term “classical logic” we can call them non-classical. In 
my paper I plan to develop, comment and justify the theses presented above 
and define some mentioned operators. 
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In the last three centuries the problem of evil has occupied the great 
philosophers and theologians in discussions about the existence of this 
phenomenon may or may not be directly related to God. Researchers in 
these fields, like Leibniz, applied the theodicy to answer the argument that 
evil is evident in the permissibility of God. In another position we find that 
Kant, that to discuss about evil, prefers foreclose on aporia (logical 
difficulties). In the late of twentieth century, researchers like Paul Ricoeur 
and Alvin Plantinga become references in themes as “God, Evil, and the 
Metaphysics Of Freedom”. Despite they have given convincing answers as 
the "defense of free will" (Plantinga, Alvin, 1978), they are far from be 
unanimous as definitive answer. 
With approaches, not only in Metaphysics but also in Science of 
Logic, the object of this work is, from St. Augustine's thoughts, contained 
in the fundamental principle: “Every Being is Good. The Evil is a 
Privation" about the problem of evil that does not come from God but come 
from creatures that generate them by the free will (Agostinho, 1995), to 
reflect over the  dialectic generated by The Hegelian Logic (Hegel, 2011) 
where Hegel develops the concept of Pure Idea or Absolute Idea. For him, 
Absolute Idea can be considered the ultimate expression of the Logic. 
(Nicolau, 2010).  For Augustine the evil is not being, but the deprivation of 
being. For Hegel, is the evil illogical? Can it generate more Theodicy or 
one more argument against the existence of God? So, this paper intends to 
aim: (i) what are the consequences of these statements in the configuration 
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of what exist?, (ii) the problem of evil, being something explicit, as we can 
simply state that there is not, at least in ontological sense? and finally, (iii) 
what kinds of side effects  these placements can generate in  systems 
logically (rationally) modeled by the methods of Artificial Intelligence 
(Russell, SJ & Norvig, P., 1995)?  
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If it is a polysemous term which covers a large field of applications, it is 
certainly  the term  “Meditation” which can be found in all religions and 
not only whose meaning has also been extended to cover relaxation 
exercises devoid of religious context as well as the term meditation might 
seem to cover only the notion of brain exercise for a change of state.   
Results of medical imaging showing the influence of meditative 
exercise on the brain raise  the problem of the nature of the  perceptions:  
are they  induced ( by external  sources ) or perceived?  Are the states 
described   hitherto as spiritual ones really of such nature or are they rather 
the effects of cerebral activity? Can the religious definition of meditation, 
which has been perceived for centuries by Christianity among others as the 
vector of the "Union of the soul to God", be therefore put into question?  
To define the term meditation and particularly such as it is defined 
within the Christian tradition, we are confronted with an approach which 
can incorporate both the empirical observations of the natural sciences and 
deductive reasoning - based among others, on the axioms of faith which we 
shall develop more particularly   thanks to the testimonies of Christian 
mystics as Holy Teresa of Avila.  
In order to describe the structure of the definition of meditation, we 
will refer to the work of Professor Kr. de Werszowec Rey, a pioneer in the 
application of an expert system of verification of the logical validity of 
reasoning (Mizar MML) to the foundations of social science and religion. 
Indeed, the author, conscious of the risk to propose a coherent but an empty 
theory, has refer his formal descriptive statements to the facts provided by 
the natural and related sciences. 
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To perform his definition of a theory as a set of propositions 
fulfilled with a given model, he used the law he describes as the TWR – 
(Tarski, Wittgenstein, Russell) - based on the following statements:   
 Tarski, for whom the study of the semantics of the colloquial 
language by applying the exact methods, requests the reform of 
this language, providing it with precise structure and removing 
the equivocality of terms appearing there in. 
 Russell:  “A statement in any conceivable language, expresses 
a fact, if between the statement and the fact exists something in 
common. “
 
 
Kr. Rey has build a theory with a set of proposals defining the 
structure of the person, - with the definitions of attention, consciousness, 
freewill,- the culture and the religion we propose to use in our attempt to 
define the polysemous term  Meditation.     
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In the paper, four classes of St. Anselm’s ontological arguments for the 
existence of God are analysed. They are (a) the arguments from God’s 
perfection, (b) the arguments from His necessity, (c) the arguments from 
His eternity, and finally (d) the arguments from His simplicity. There are 
two main sources that I wish to exploit. The first one is (Jowers, 1999), a 
short study on Anselm’s Proslogion, and the second principal source is 
(Tichý, 1979). The analysis is based on Transparent Intensional Logic with 
its bi-dimensional ontology of entities organized in the ramified hierarchy 
of types. I will concentrate mainly on the arguments from God’s perfection, 
and the main result is this. Unlike other ontological arguments for the 
existence of God that are vulnerable to various objections, St. Anselm’s 
argument in Proslogion III is logically valid. The analysis goes as follows. 
First, necessary notions and principles are introduced. They are: (a) non-
trivial existence is not a property of individuals but of individual offices, to 
wit the property of being occupied by an individual; (b) the notion of 
requisite is defined, which is a necessary relation between an office O and a 
property R: necessarily, if a happens to occupy O then a has the property R. 
(c) I demonstrate that an argument of the form “R is a requisite of O, hence 
the holder of O has the property R” is invalid. In order to be valid, it must 
be of the form “R is a requisite of O, the office O is occupied, hence the 
holder of O has the property R”. Finally, (d) higher-order offices that can 
be occupied by individual offices are defined. Their requisites are 
properties of individual offices.   
The analysis of Anselm’s arguments goes as follows. First, the 
expression ‘God’ denotes an individual office or role, a ‘thing to be’, rather 
than a particular individual. Thus the question whether God exists is a 
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legitimate one. I analyze Anselm’s ‘that, than which nothing greater can be 
conceived’. Since ‘greater than’ is a relation-in-intension between 
individual offices here, the expression denotes a second-order office, and 
its requisites are properties of first-order offices such as necessary 
existence. The second Anselm’s assumption is that individual office that 
has the property of necessary existence is greater than any other office 
lacking this property. From these it follows that the first-order holder of the 
office denoted by ‘that, than which nothing greater can be conceived’ (that 
is God) enjoys the property of necessary existence. Thus God exists 
necessarily, hence also actually. Anselm’s argument is logically valid. If it 
were also sound, the existence of God would be proved. But then an atheist 
would differ from a believer only by the former not believing whereas the 
latter believing a tautology, which is absurd. The way out is throwing 
doubts on Anselm’s assumption that a necessary existence makes an office 
greater than any other office lacking this property. I will demonstrate that 
just opposite, the essence of a necessarily occupied office is minimal, 
because necessary analytical existence works against greatness. The greater 
(more important) office, the more difficult for an individual it is to hold it; 
thus an office that is occupied in all worlds and times must have a poor 
essence containing only trivial requisites. 
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Descartes and Ibn Tufayl, although with different purposes, try to prove 
God`s existence, not by theological arguments but through a philosophical 
way and an intuitive experience. Descartes`s Meditations and Ibn Tufayl`s 
Hay Ibn Yagzan both finally bring their readers with this conclusion that 
the edification that leads to comprehensive understanding of things isn`t the 
result of external master`s training, but that of intuition; the intuition 
requires purification of mind from senses and prejudiced beliefs. Because 
these two philosophers believe that, human`s inner intuition is interrupted 
due to their attention to senses and social behaviors (Corbin, 1994). 
Ibn Tufayl believed that if human avoid intrigues of sense and use 
his mind in orderly and methodologically and reflect inside himself on the 
primary source of all things, finds himself directly affront of God and in 
other words in the heart  of reality. Therefore, it can be said, according to 
Ibn Tufayl the concept of God is innate in us, and this innate concept is 
obtained not through the senses but through intuitive experience; for Ibn 
Tufayl , this intuition is not only the most certain way of knowledge of 
God, but also he believed that intuition confirms the results of the other 
proofs in proving God (Tufayl, 1986). 
Ibn Tufayl`s expression is the reminiscent of Descartes's argument 
at the end of the third meditation: "It only remains for me to examine how I 
received this idea ]that is the infinite essence and absolute perfect[ from 
God. For I did not acquire it from the senses." After reviewing various 
options to Descartes concludes that "the only remaining alternative is that it 
is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me". And contrary to 
acquired and spurious concepts, innate concepts such as the concept of God 
and the soul are neither derived from the senses nor constructed by my 
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mind, But are revealed through intuition of a precise and clear mind that 
begins only with light of reason (Descartes, 1995). 
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Craig’s Kalam cosmological argument for God’s existence is simply 
summarised as follows: 
1.0. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.  
2.0. The universe began to exist.  
3.0. Therefore, the universe has a cause. (Craig & Sinclair (2009), p.102) 
Craig (Craig & Sinclair (2009), §2.1, §2.2)devotes particular 
attention to premise 2.0., recognises the support that it requires, and 
formulates two different subsets of arguments to provide it. These subsets 
both try to show that it would be impossible for there to be an infinite 
number of past events, and hence it would be impossible for the universe to 
not have a beginning. The first argues that any kind of actual infinity is 
impossible, and thus there can’t be an infinite number of past events:. The 
second subset is much weaker, and argues that specifically any infinity 
formed by successive addition is impossible.  
In this essay, I will defend the possibility of there being an infinite 
number of past events, by attempting to undermine the support that Craig 
provides for premise 2.12.. In short, I will be attempting to defend the 
viability of Aristotle’s position with respect to time: that although there is 
an infinite past, due to the fact that time has no beginning, the infinite past 
wouldn’t in fact consist of an actual infinity. Instead, the collection of a 
series of past events would merely constitute a potential infinity. Craig’s 
justification for 2.12. is essentially at the core of his central argument 
(Craig & Sinclair (2009), pp. 117-124), which is known as ‘the traversal 
argument’ against the infinite past that he uses in the context of the subsets 
to justify premise 2.21). So as well as explaining how the past might 
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constitute a potential infinite, I will also try to repudiate Craig’s traversal 
argument in order to defend this account of time. 
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It is classic the Aristotelian division between apodictic reasoning (logic) 
and dialectical reasoning (topic-rhetorical). In the first, the premises of 
thinking are clear. In the second case, the premises are merely probable. 
According Viehweg, reading the Topics of the Estagirita philosopher, the 
differentiation between the two forms of reasoning leads to the possibility 
to distinguish two forms of approach the same issue: sometimes giving 
emphasis to the previous systematic character to which the problem is or 
should be subsumed, sometimes giving emphasis to the problem itself and 
therefore to find a system that can solve it. Thinking like this way the 
religious discourse as logical is postulate the pre-existence of 
incontrovertible premises. The solution seems to point to the consideration 
of rhetorical character and topic of this kind of discourse. The purpose of 
this study aims to address this issue and clarify the possible ways to solve 
it, by considering the religious speech as a “God’s ethos”, it means that the 
all most kind of religious have a conception of who is God and what He 
pretends. But when we consider the ethos of someone we do consider it 
dialectically connected to the pathos of someone else. Traditionally, this is 
a rhetorical and not a logical field.     
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We hold that contemporary analytic philosophy of religion is culturally 
biased towards monotheism and does not represent the beliefs of a large 
share of mankind. 
Most arguments intended to provide reasons to believe in a deity 
could satisfy those of a Jewish, Christian or Islamic persuasion but 
probably not many Hindus, Pagan Reconstructionists and the followers of 
Chinese and African folk religions. Polytheism is rarely articulated or 
seriously discussed (Leftow, 1988 and Steinhart, 2012 are some interesting 
exceptions). 
Although the reasons behind this state of affairs is itself worthy of 
research, we are not concerned here with the sociological question but with 
the logical question; can there be sound arguments for polytheism? 
The late Robert K. Meyer (Meyer, 1987) has famously advanced a 
cosmological argument for the existence of God grounded in the Axiom of 
Choice through the usage of its equivalent formulation in Zorn’s Lemma. 
We consider some of Aquinas’ proofs of the existence of God (Sobel, 
2003) in the light of Zorn’s Lemma within an adequate formal framework 
to argue in a different direction. The meaning of such proofs is examined 
when we change the underlying set theoretic model. We use Cohen forcing 
to generate those models for an adequate Suppes-predicate formalization of 
(portions of) a corresponding theology system. 
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“Which Logic characterise the conjunction between contrary rules by Plato 
and Aristotle for example used in the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas? 
What are the effects to the development of Religion and Society up to now? 
Is there any dependence to the way of announcements given by leaders and 
the common behaviour of society and the application of logics?” 
These questions summarize some of the topics of the actual 
research work done to combine an analysis of old knowledge with actual 
ideas in Logic. A sample can be found in the strategic juridical decision 
logic SJDL (Schatt 2014) or in the Public Announcement Logic PAL in 
actual discussions. 
Thomas worked on a compromise between the opposite positions 
in the philosophies of Plato (Platon, 1958) and Aristotle (Aristoteles, 1986, 
1978). The different position of Plato and Aristotle leaded to the so called 
“dispute of universalia” in the middle age with a focus on the positions of 
“ante rem” by Plato (“Das Allgemeine existiert als transzendentale Idee vor 
dem einzelnen Ding”) and “in rem” by Aristotle (“Das Allgemeine existiert 
im einzelnen Ding”) (Höffe 2001, S. 122).Obviously it was necessary to 
find a new way by Thomas (Thomas, 1970), which allows the actuality of 
prior papers written by Doctors of church (Augustinus, 1998) in the 
medieval scholasticism (Ockham, 1984). This talk will discuss the 
question, if a Logic calculus can be found to analyze the background of the 
merging of two positions. A study of classical types of logics like the 
syllogism by Aristotle or the first-order logic will show no results to the 
question. If the logical base will be changed by using some kinds of modal 
logics like the SJDL, it will open some ways to find solutions. 
 
139 Abstracts 
The next step will lead to concerns in religion and society. A 
question could be, can a logic be found, which covers the strategy and the 
decisions made by state independently of the kind of the state and the 
bundling with religion Main religions in the world can be summarized 
(aside the kinds of nature religions) by Hebraism, Christianity, Islam, 
Buddhism, Hinduism and Shinto’s and with the atheism. The 
characteristics of the existing states vary from anarchism, dictators to 
democratic forms. They use different connections to religion like Laicism 
or strong dependence from one religion.  
The talk will end with a discussion about the kind of the logic used 
and their possible applications. It will refer to some actual research done at 
the Munich Center for Technology in Society at the Technische Universität 
München. 
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There was a connection between notions about religion, mathematics, about 
theory of cognition and scientific argumentation in history of philosophy. 
Pythagoreans and Neopythagoreans connected numbers, numerical 
relations and geometrical figures with plots of ancient Greek and Egyptian 
myths. 
The notion “the book of the nature” became known in the European 
philosophy due to a Byzantine theologian and philosopher Maximus the 
Confessor. 
Later Galileo Galilei considered that the book of the nature was written in 
the language of mathematics and that who knew mathematics was able to 
read the book of the nature in the same way as the Creator. In this Galileo 
Galilei combined the Christian philosophy which was based on the Biblical 
tradition with the Pythagorean and Platonic tradition of the attitude to the 
God as to a mathematician first of all. 
Galileo Galilei’s opinion that the book of the nature is written in 
the language of mathematics is well-known and this opinion is often 
mentioned. But researchers often pay a great attention to that Galileo 
Galilei expressed his attitude not only to mathematics as a language which 
the book of the nature is written in but to possibilities of human cognition 
too. But it was this grounding of possibilities of human cognition that 
became one of the grounds for the European rationalism. 
One can believe that this approach of the European philosophical 
rationalism in the modern age to possibilities of human cognition was 
generalized by Hegel in his doctrine about the identity of the thinking and 
being in the theory of cognition. Hegel considered that as the whole world 
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existed and developed in accordance with laws of reason, or, otherwise 
speaking, the nature was organized in the same way as the thinking the 
world appeared to be cognized by a human reason. 
Before Hegel made his conclusions Schelling had made the same 
conclusions. And it is possible that Hegel borrowed his ideas from 
Schelling. But Hegel’s words about the identity of the thinking and being 
are more known. 
Thus, the introduction of the notion “the book of the nature” into 
the European philosophical vocabulary by Maximus the Confessor enabled 
such doctrine which is often named gnoseological optimism to appear 
within rationalism of the New age. 
 
 
  
 
142 Handbook of the 1st World Congress on Logic and Religion 
ONDŘEJ BERAN 
 
THE LIMITS OF DZ PHILLIPS’ WITTGENSTEINIAN 
POLEMIC AGAINST GOD’S OMNIPOTENCE 
 
Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 
Czech Republic 
ondrej.beran@flu.cas.cz 
 
DZ Phillips’ (Phillips, 2004) argues against abstract conceptions of God’s 
omnipotence thus: 
“1. To say that God is omnipotent is to say that God can do 
anything describable in any practice without contradiction. 
2. There are countless activities in different practices, describable 
there without contradiction, which God cannot do. 
3. Therefore God is not omnipotent.” 
(2) is substantiated by a chain of examples of what God cannot do: ride a 
bike, lick an ice-cream, have sexual intercourse, and more. The 
impossibility is of “logical” nature according to Phillips, which means 
“grammatical” in the Wittgensteinian sense: “God can lick an ice-cream” is 
not a logical contradiction sensu stricto, we just cannot make reasonable 
sense of it. 
This notion of nonsensicality draws on Wittgenstein: there are 
alleged possibilities, based on insufficient consideration of real language 
use. One can be tempted to say “I can know I have pain”, but upon closer 
inspection, equally much sense would have to be made by “I may not know 
I have pain”. Whereby we see the non-sensicality of “I can know I have 
pain”; this proposition is not really used. Its reasonable use cannot be 
imagined, that is, a rule sanctioning its correct application cannot be 
identified (Wittgenstein, 2007). 
God’s capacity of licking an ice-cream would also require further 
commitments: God’s having tongue with taste buds, thus God’s being a 
bodily creature in very much the same sense as people are. Just as with 
unconscious pain, we end up with a statement without reasonable use. 
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Phillips’ Wittgensteinian conception of meaningfulness, relying 
upon the warranting rules, is, however, too abstract and elitist. It 
presupposes that our language works in a pseudo-Hegelian way: that only 
what is correct and (in a pragmatic sense) rational could exist within it. 
Phillips wants to eliminate the pseudo-scholastic explanations. The 
miracle of the weeping Mary statue is equally inappropriately “explained” 
as illusion or trickery, as it is “explained” by supernatural powers that made 
“dead matter” to cry. True grammar of religious language concerns seeing 
such events in certain – miraculous – light, in Phillips’ eyes. 
Along with Wittgenstein, Phillips attributes the metaphysical point 
of view to misguided philosophies exclusively. In their opinion, no real 
religious practice, interconnected with real contextualized ways of 
speaking, can entail such metaphysics. But there are real religious 
movements and religious practices that operate with literal omnipotence of 
God, that strive at “explaining” miracles by means of a taxonomical system 
of supernatural powers, etc.  
Phillips neither shows that God is not omnipotent, nor that there is 
no religious practitioner who can believe in His omnipotence. Only that 
“grammatical” analysis of the literal notion of God’s omnipotence reveals 
certain gaps. But their occurrence is no exception among linguistic 
practices. Language is heterogeneous; meaningfulness cannot be expected 
universally. 
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The systematic function and results of Hegel’s analysis of the a priori 
argument for God’s existence are not entirely expounded in the field of his 
Philosophy of Religion: they disclose precise logical characteristics and 
aims of Hegel’s notion of idealism. Moreover, they express fundamental 
limits to our epistemological approach to reality. 
As opposite to the formal approach of natural theology, Hegel 
rejects the use of judgment conceived as structure apt to connect a concept 
with its existence. Nevertheless, it is notorious the high number of 
references to the ontological proof for God’s existence that we find in the 
Science of Logic (Hegel, 1985). 
In a series of lectures held in 1829 on the ontological proof for 
God’s existence (Hegel, 1986), as well as in some late courses on Logic 
(Hegel, 2001) and in the Science of Logic (Hegel, 1985), Hegel claims that 
what prevents natural theology from being part of the encyclopedic 
sciences is the reduction of an object to the mere identity of that object (the 
judgment: “A is B”).  
His criticism addresses not just the rejection for the existence to be 
a predicate (as Kant did) but also the very structure of the judgment for 
determining the identity of the absolute object. In his Lectures on the proof 
of God’s existence Hegel explains that the necessary postulate to 
understand the very speculative essence of the a priori proof is a new 
understanding of logical mediation, that we can verily conceive via what he 
calls Erhebung des Geistes. This “elevation” doesn’t consist in an 
experience of the understanding, but rather in a different use of the patters 
of logical inferences, i.e. a new understanding of the syllogism or, in 
broader sense, a new account of reason. 
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The thinking process involved in the definition of the absolute 
reality turns to be the very same process required for proving its own 
existence. On the one hand, this results in a new conception of the modal 
categories, and on the other, it implies a new account of reason as the 
faculty able to conceive such categories. 
It has been long well known that the Science of Logic provides 
definitions of categories which are at the same time justification of the 
same; Hegel offers different models of internal justification of a Dasein, 
and yet the syllogism only provides the connection between internal 
justification of a Dasein and its absoluteness.  
Moreover, the “elevation of the spirit” assumes that the syllogistic 
reason is not a faculty that infers, but a faculty that produces values and 
meanings, i.e. the basis for the understanding of what really exists.  
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The paper will focus on fundamental features of one of the most thought-
provoking theories ever developed in India which combines a logical 
system of predication with a semantic machinery to adequately describe 
complex reality within the ramifications of the natural language, namely 
the theory of the seven-fold modal description (syād-vāda). That theory, 
worked out within the folds of Jainism, was a part of a larger philosophical 
enterprise, known as the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda) 
(Matilal, 1981; Ganeri, 2002), an important feature of which was both to 
disambiguate the natural language and to provide a true representation of 
an real thing, which is by nature multi-faceted and interrelated with a range 
of other objects and which can never be adequately reflected in language. 
The apparent problem was how to achieve such goals with a natural 
language which was by nature one-dimensional, and in a situation when, as 
a Jaina maxim states, “every sentence functions with a restriction”. The 
process of context-bound analysis of contents and of disambiguation of 
sentence, involved a number of stages, including the use of sentential 
functors, multi-layered indexation of predicates with so-called parameters 
and aspects, semantic emphasis of properties, and the use of seven 
sentential figures, which were permutations of more basic structures 
(Balcerowicz, 2014). 
Having outlined crucial features of the formal system, the paper 
will demonstrate why the strict ascetic-religious movement of the Jainas 
developed such a complex theory and how this particular method of 
context-dependent logical analysis of sentences and of semantic inquiry 
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was preferred than any other, inasmuch it seemed to serve certain dogmatic 
needs more efficiently. 
The main thesis of the paper is that fundamental considerations 
behind what may look like a pure logical-semantic theory were moral and 
soteriological, not a quest for truth or strictly logical interests of Jainism. 
Surprising as it may seem, it was primarily the practical application of 
monastic rules of conduct and moral concerns to avoid harm done fellow 
living beings (ahiṁsā) that prompted salvation-oriented Jaina monks to 
develop such an intricate and sophisticated system of logic and semantics. 
Accordingly, Jaina theory of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda) is a 
interesting instance of how logic and semantics can be tools serving moral 
cause rather than purely philosophical inquiry. 
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Trinity is a complex concept derived from christian religious belief. It is 
related to the nature of God and asserts that God is one substance 
composed by three persons: the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Prima 
facie, this definition seems to violate classical logic principles of identity 
and non-contradiction. For, the numerical predicates being one and being 
three might be incompatible predicates while assigned to the same entity. In 
order to vanish this incompatibility we appeal to conceptual analysis and 
mereology. The former to clarify how three persons can share the same 
substance. And the formal tools of the latter might be useful in order to 
explain the parthood relation between the entities evolved in christian 
trinity conception. I recognize that is a very wide subject that was much 
discussed in the medieval period of history of philosophy. In order to 
sharpen the discussion, I will follow a recent debate between brazilian 
philosophers (Imaguire 2003, 2012; and Marques, 2010). Imaguire (2002) 
proposes a definition of God and an explanation of trinity that is based on 
the russellian logical type theory. He proposes that God would be concept 
of second-order property that instantiates three first-order properties. 
Marques (2010) criticizes this view in order to keep the mysterium of 
Trinity. I believe with Imaguire that the foggy of theological concepts can 
brighten by philosophical logic analysis. The purpose of this talk is to offer 
something dogmatic assertions evades: an explanation. So, in order to 
follow Imaguire’s approach I present an alternative way to explain Trinity 
by taking the predicates of core mereology  (M) as presented by Varzi 
(2014). The predicates are Proper Part [PPxy =df  Pxy & ¬(x =y)], the 
Proper Extension [PExy =df  Pyx & ¬(x =y)] and Underlap [Uxy =df 
∃ z(Pxz & Pyz)]. 
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God might be understood as a Proper Extension of its constituent’s 
persons, although not been the same of each person. Each person (Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit) might be considered as Proper Part of God. If we 
concede that God is an universal being, we can take the predicate Underlap 
and assert that the substance of God underlaps all the three persons. 
Formally, representing God by g, Father by f, Son by s, the Holy Spirit by 
h. And taking that God is one substance divided into three distinct persons, 
we have: PPfg & PPsg & PPhg and PEgf & PEgs & PEgh. 
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The so-called theory of karma, or law of karma, is one of the distinguishing 
aspects of Hinduism and of other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. There 
have been many different versions for the theory of karma, from the 
sometimes obscure passages of the Upanishads, to the descriptions made 
by several figures of the Mahabharata and Puranas, and to the sometimes 
overconfident descriptions of modern Indian gurus. Perhaps a fair 
description of the theory or law could go like this: Besides its purely 
physical consequences, our actions have also morally just consequences 
which might occur either in this life or in the next ones, and which affect 
our environment, genetic make-up, physical characteristics, social status at 
birth, length of life, etc., as well as our dispositions and tendencies.  
The theory of karma has been sometimes said to be determinist and 
fatalist: “if we are justified in our acceptance of the causal dogma, there 
does not seem to be any legitimate way to avoid fatalism. If the present is 
determined by the past so as to admit of an accurate prediction of the past 
[…], how can we avoid the conclusion that the future is similarly 
determined by the past and the present?” (Suryanarayanan, 1940, p.82). On 
the other hand, there is a sense in which the law of karma is closely 
connected with indeterminism and the freedom that humans are supposed 
to have to choose their future. Radhakrishnan, for example, says: “Man is 
not a mere product of nature. He is mightier than his karma. […] The law 
of karma, which rules the lower nature of man, has nothing to do with the 
spiritual in hum […] The essence of spirit is freedom. By its exercise man 
can check and control his natural impulses.” (Radhakrishnan, p. 246).  
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The so-called branching time theory, developed mainly by Nuel 
Belnap and his collaborators in several writings – see, for instante, (Belnap 
& Green, 1994) and (Belnap, 2001) – has been sometimes described as the 
best formal approach we have to determinism and indeterminism. In fact, it 
provides us with a rigorous way to say what determinism, indeterminism 
and fatalism are. My purpose in this talk is to find out to what extent 
branching time theory can be used to clarify the paradox shown above. 
More specifically, I will try to describe, inside the semantic framework of 
branching time theory, the specific way according to which the theory of 
karma can be said to be both determinist and fatalist as well as the way 
according to which it can be said to be indeterminist and compatible to our 
free-will (in a libertarian sense).  
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In his attack on St. Anselm's ontological argument Kant echoed Thomas 
Aquinas who separated essence from existence, and objected to the view that 
existence is a standard predicate, i.e. that it denotes a property that is 
instantiated by individuals. According to Kant predicating `existence' of an 
individual does not add anything to the essence of a being, a claim which 
clearly only holds if we – contra Aquinas – identify the notions of being 
(essence) and existence. 
Kant's view that existence is not a predicate on a par with predicates 
like 'human' or 'mortal', could made precise when Frege invented the notion 
of quantification. For Frege (and Russell) existence is not a standard predicate 
that is instantiated by individuals, but a higher order predicate. The 
Frege/Russell view is supported by the weird truth-conditions that a theory 
that takes 'existence' to be a standard predicate, assigns to positive and 
negative existential sentences as `A does (not) exist' (which come out 
respectively as tautological or contradictory). The logical form of such 
statements is that of an existentially quantified sentence. The underlying 
philosophical claim is that existence takes priority over quantification and is 
thus a concept of a very different kind. This view is entrenched in the 
standard semantics of first order logic. Given an antecedently given domain 
of individuals all names refer to entities out of this domain and quantifiers 
range over this domain. 
Following the trend of his time, following Russell and unaware of the 
fact that Russell seriously misrepresented Meinong, Quine made the Russell 
view famous with his slogan `to be is to be the value of a bound variable' 
(Quine 1953). Up to the advent of free logic his infamous paper was thought 
to have killed Meinong's intricate theory of objects once and for all. 
Meinong had a different view, however. Meinong's object theory 
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makes a tripartite distinction between existence, subsistence and non-being 
whatsoever (`Ausserseiendheid'). Since in the standard semantics of first-
order-logic quantifiers have existential import by definition, the obvious 
move is to undo quantifiers from their existential load thus allowing us to 
quantify over both existent objects and objects that have a different kind of 
being (e.g. Routley, 1980 and Priest, 2005). Such a neo-Meinongian move 
yields a bipartite distinction between existing objects and objects that have a 
different kind of being, a distinction that is amply supported in modal 
discourse and natural language discourse on fictional beings. 
In this talk I will discuss the essential ambiguity in the notion of 
being from a Meinongian point of view. For the neo-Meinonging there are 
two interrelated problems: how to give a consistent logical interpretation of a 
Meinongian universe and, equally important, how to give a philosophical 
interpretation of the varieties being. I discuss the philosophical implications 
of the distinctions between various kinds of being and evaluate Dummett's 
view that ontological arguments essentially rely on a Meinongian ontology 
(Dummett 1993). 
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The logical form of all main arguments against the so-called theological 
compatibilism concerning divine foreknowledge of future contingent 
events takes the form of consequence-style arguments – let for instance be 
T a point of time in the past, GK the sentence operator that expresses ‘God 
knows/infallibly believes that...’ and pt := p(t) a proposition that articulates 
an event at a time t > T (cf. Zagzebski [2011], 75), then it holds:  
1. God infallibly believed pt in the past: GKTpt.  
2. I cannot do anything about the fact that God infallibly believed 
pt in the past (Necessity of the Past and lack of power over God’s infallible 
nature): N(GKTpt).  
3. Necessarily, if God believed pt in the past, then pt is true 
(Definition of ‘infallibility’): □(GKTpt  pt).  
4. I cannot do anything about the fact that if God believed pt in the 
past, then pt is true (by (3.) and well-known rule α: □p├ Np): N(GKTpt  
pt).  
5. If (2.) and (4.), then I cannot do anything about the fact that pt is 
true. [β-rule: N(GKTpt), N(GKTpt  pt) ├ Npt]  
6. Therefore, I cannot do anything about the fact that pt is true. 
(Modus ponens): Npt.  
The debate within the philosophy of religion however takes place 
almost exclusively on a direct level, i.e. either the premises of the argument 
or the rules of inference the argument is based on are either attacked or 
defended. Yet for an adequate evaluation of the philosophical status of 
theological compatibilism it is necessary to analyse this type of arguments 
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more thor oughly – and that means on the fundamental level within the 
models of modal logic themselves.  
In my paper, four cases will be considered: First, (a) the argument 
against a local-temporal divine foreknowledge in general (simple 
foreknowledge), (b) the argument against temporal-sempiternal divine 
foreknowledge, and (c) the argument against postvolitional Molinist 
foreknowledge (free knowledge – Luis de Molina already discussed similar 
arguments in his Concordia, disp. 52.); i.e. if by his Middle Knowledge 
God knows a counterfactual of freedom C □→ A and decides to actualize 
circumstances C at time t, he therefore foresees that action A will be 
performed (cf. Perzsyk [2003]):  
1. □{[(Ct □→ A)  Ct]  A} Consequence of Molinism  
2. □[(Ct □→ A)  (Ct  A)] from 1.  
3. N[(Ct □→ A)  (Ct  A)] 2., α  
4. N(Ct □→ A) Fixity of Middle Knowledge  
5. N(Ct  A) 3., 4., β  
6. NCt Fixity of Antecedents  
7. NA 5., 6., β  
In all these arguments, the No-Choice-Operator N is, due to the α-
rule, weaker than the necessity operator □. This is an essential requirement, 
for if both operators collapse (i.e. if Np ≡ □p is a theorem) consequence-
style arguments become philosophically meaningless. Yet, those systems of 
modal logic in which the difference between both operators can be 
expressed are precisely the systems in which the Transfer of Necessity 
Principles (β-rules) necessary for consequence-style arguments are not 
universally valid. It follows that consequence-style arguments against 
divine foreknowledge become under strict modal-logical premises useless – 
a hard blow to opponents of theological compatibilism. Subsequently (d), 
the case of atemporal versions of consequence-style arguments, that do not 
revolve around foreknowledge but atemporal-eternal divine knowledge, 
shall be discussed. It will turn out that in the atemporal-eternal case Np ≡ 
□p is a theorem. 
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No Christian theological project of the past century has been as ambitious, 
as discussed and as voluminous as that found in the fifteen volumes of the 
German edition of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s ‘Trilogy’. What distinguishes 
this vast opus as regards the role of logical thought in theology is its 
unusual relegation of Theologik to the third and final part.  Balthasar begins 
with a ‘theological aesthetic’ (vols. 1-7), exploring the beauty and glory 
(Herrlichkeit) of God in what he argues should be the first, fundamental 
and, as it were, sensorial encounter with the mystery of Christ, a meeting to 
be thoroughly experienced and pondered before extending an invitation to 
the labors of logic. But even this is not propaedeutic enough. An additional 
pre-logical dimension is likewise insisted upon, one which will further 
temper the theologian with imperative dispositions of docility, well before 
rigorous cogitation can be trusted around such august topics. This, 
Balthasar argues, is drama. A ‘theological dramatics’ (vols. 8-12) presents 
the entire repertoire of dramaturgical art as something needed not only to 
study Shakespeare or Racine, but also to grasp the profoundly dramatic 
character of the Gospel’s founding events. Only after these two prolonged 
baptisms in beauty and drama does Balthasar permit his discourse to 
inquire as to what critical, rational thought might contribute to the 
enterprise of fides quaerens intellectum.   
The Theologik consists of three tomes (vols. 13-15), united by the 
concept of truth: vol. 1: “The Truth of the World”, vol. 2: “The Truth of 
God”, and vol. 3: “The Spirit of Truth”.  In the present paper we shall look 
at what Balthasar considered to be a pivotal and organizing notion in his 
entire theology, namely analogy, and in particular how he explains its role 
in that chapter of “The Truth of God” entitled: ‘Divine and Human Logic’. 
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His critical engagement with Hegelian dialectic is of particular interest, as 
also the way in which he uses the logic of analogy to cast a retrospective 
light upon the glory and drama highlighted in the previous volumes. 
Balthasar derived much of his approach to analogical thought from the 
Analogia Entis of Erich Przywara SJ, itself based on an innovative reading 
of the Thomist tradition on the topic. This work has been translated into 
English only quite recently, and is being greeted with increasing interest, 
along with other yet untranslated texts of this neglected German thinker.  
After presenting a summary of the chapter regarding divine and 
human logic, and situating it within the larger corpus of the Trilogy, I will 
attempt to show its relevance in allowing us to look anew upon all religious 
phenomena, modeled on the way the Swiss theologian thus reviews the 
glory and drama of the Christian mysteries. Finally, I will draw some 
personal conclusions on how Balthasar might help us to better understand 
both the contributions and, more importantly perhaps, the limitations of 
logic as a tool in religious studies in general, and Christian theology in 
particular. 
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In this article, after brief explanation of golden rule in Abrahamic religions 
as Islam, Christianity and Judaism, and Characterizing golden rule, we 
pursue to explain that golden rule -as logical consistency- is a logical rule, 
and who is rational and think logically, have to use golden rule. “Golden 
Rule as a model of logical consistency” is an approach that Harry J. 
Gensler asserted. Also we will explain the relationship between Ethics and 
Religion - there are a various debates about this issue - and we will 
conclude that the area of Ethics is larger than Religion. Actually, religion is 
a part of ethics and accounts as sub-category of it. Then, we pursue to 
explaining that “believers to God” have to use golden rule themselves and 
they should use it more and more; because they accepted golden rule in 
their religion as a believer, and accepted it in their mind as a human that 
have logical thinking. On the other hand, one of the basic standards to 
distinction between valid and invalid religion is golden rule. Actually, 
religion to be a real religion should not be incompatible whit golden rule 
and logical consistency. Finally, we will conclude that “believers to God” 
whatever use golden rule and logical consistency more, they should believe 
to God better. Because they should have a moral life and they accepted 
golden rule in their religion. And actually, whatever the believer think more 
logically, he will be a better believer to God. 
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In traditional western theism, God is maximally great. Omnipotence, 
omniscience and omnibenevolence are usually taken to be central divine 
attributes. However, these attributes seems puzzling to many philosophers 
(Hoffman, 2012). The divine attributes often behave paradoxically and 
apparently contradict each other (Brummer, 1992). The omnipotence 
paradoxes and the logical problem of evil reveal the problematic nature of 
the concept of a supremely perfect God. 
The central issue of the divine attributes is that is there a consistent 
analysis of the concept of a supremely perfect entity? And since 
consistency is the most basic requirement for the logical possibility, the 
question is taken to be equivalent to this question: is a supremely perfect 
entity logically possible? 
Since the concept of a supremely perfect entity seems inconsistent 
and therefore impossible, many philosophers believe that the power and the 
science of God should have logical and temporal limitations. In fact, within 
the framework of classical logic, the normal way to overcome the problem 
of inconsistency of the divine attributes is to place limitations on the power 
and the science of God.  
However some philosophers believe that it may be rational to 
accept an inconsistent position. According to them, there are many different 
considerations that speak for or against the rational acceptability of a view 
(e.g., its simplicity, its explanatory, etc) and consistency is just one of them. 
Therefore it may turn out that a theory lacking the virtue of consistency 
overcomes its rivals in all or most of the other respects (Priest, 2013). 
It seems that by constructing a paraconsistent logical model, in 
which contradiction is not impossible and logical consequence relations are 
not explosive, the notion of God as the entity whose power and science 
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have no limitations could be preserved. In such a system the concept of 
logical possibility doesn't depend on consistency, therefore despite the fact 
that the answer of the first question (is there a consistent analysis of the 
concept of a supremely perfect entity?) is "No", the answer of the latter one 
(is a supremely perfect entity logically possible?) could be "Yes". 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate whether or not it is 
rational to construct a paranonsistent logical system that is compatible with 
problematic divine attributes. 
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In this paper I propose to read some biblical passages from a particular sort 
of logical analysis. This means that I will not attempt to make an exegetic 
study of the texts. Instead, I will use them to follow a certain logical 
problem, namely, how to rationally and logically deal with contradictions, 
and I will draw some consequences regarding the relationship between 
logic and rationality.  
For this purpose, I will examine two cases that exemplify different 
ways to deal with contradictions, one extracted from the Bible and another 
involving some passages of it. The first case is the story of Susanna and the 
Elders, in Daniel’s book, in which contradictions lead to consider the 
Elders account against the chastity of Susanna as false. The second one is a 
reading of the passages about Jesus’ resurrection written by the Four 
Evangelists in which, in spite of the contradictions in the details, the 
resurrection is assumed as a fact. Facing these different attitudes in relation 
to contradictions, I inquire about their rationality. I propose here a 
perspective according to which rationality is closely linked to logicity. 
Thus, I take as a starting point the idea that if a certain position or attitude 
is rational, then it must be logical. That means, it must fulfill implicitly or 
explicitly the logical system presuppositions (in a general way, a logical 
system understood as an organized system of rules and primitive 
propositions that allow us to structure some specific knowledge). In this 
context, I try to show that, Daniel’s attitude facing the contradictions of the 
Elders’ accounts against Susanna is rational because it is supported by 
classical logic. And the Christian attitude facing the contradictions on 
Jesus’ resurrection accounts is rational because it could be supported by 
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some paraconsistent logic, like da Costa’s C1 system (Da Costa, 1980; 
Bobenrieth, 1996). Finally, I present some questions arising from this 
perspective. Some of them have to do with the possible relativization of 
rationality, the link between rationality and logic, and the rationality of 
religious belief. 
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Civilizations during all the centuries thought the universe to be eternal. 
According to Plato, for example, Demiurge fashioned the material universe 
after the model of the Ideas. Demiurge was himself an uncreated being that 
worked on uncreated matter to fashion the universe we live in.  
The amazing fact is that the conception of an eternal universe lasted 
from Antiquity to less than one hundred years ago. There was only one 
book, written in the 14th Century B.C. that had a different conception about 
the existence of the universe: the book of Genesis. 
The idea that this book presented was considered so bizarre, that it 
was hardly taken seriously by science for at least 33 centuries. The idea 
was that the universe had not existed forever, but on the contrary – had 
been created out of nothing. 
Creation out of nothing (creation ex nihilo) was a concept that no 
one was willing to accept, partly because the idea of “nothing” is not to be 
taken as only the absence of form or matter. The idea of “nothing” means 
the absence of everything, that is, it means that there was no space, no 
matter, no time, and no laws of nature 
Scientists were completely astonished when 20th and 21st century 
science began to offer evidence (such as the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics, the Expanding Universe, Background Radiation, and the 
Theory of Relativity, among others) that the universe was really created out 
of nothing, and therefore, its cause must be non-spatial, immaterial, and 
atemporal. Additionally, it had to be all-powerful, since it created 
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everything out of nothing; and personal, since de creation of the universe 
had to be a decision, since there was no law of nature to explain it.  
Contemporary science has shown that the universe is completely 
fine-tuned in order to permit life to exist. There are over 120 variables that 
are fine-tuned for a life-enabling universe to exist. Let’s take the expansion 
rate of the universe as an example. If even just a minute portion of this rate 
was altered, the formation of planets wouldn’t be possible, and therefore, 
the existence of life wouldn’t be possible either. 
Besides that, it’s been shown with studies of DNA that it is a 
language carrying an incredible amount of meaningful information. As 
according to both our scientific (see SETI NASA project, for instance) and 
common sense criteria, meaningful information is always a product of a 
mind. Therefore, the cause of the universe has to be very intelligent in 
order to be able to fine-tune all the variables for a life-permitting universe 
to exist, and this cause has to have a mind; for according to the criteria 
used, only minds produce meaningful information. 
Therefore, the scientific evidences for the beginning and for the 
fine-tunning of the universe not only support the Christian answer to the 
question “Does God exist?” but also end up with the same characteristics 
for the cause of the universe that are found for God in the Bible: atemporal, 
non-spatial, immaterial, all-powerful, intelligent, and personal. 
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It is a well-known philosophical investigation that religious sentences 
should be based on knowledge in a certain way. Alvin Plantinga (the 
Warrant-Triology) tries to defend religious knowledge as justified true 
belief for decades. Mostly scientists and religion-critiques suppose that 
religion is irrational and thus perhaps dangerous. 
The critiques as well as the defenders imply a non-linguistic world. 
The critiques concern a difference between empirical evidences and 
corresponding formulas, which can explain the world. Human cognition 
thus would be the result of evolution just to recognise the laws of the world 
that lie within nature. 
The defenders instead react to the critiques by defending the 
religious language against an empirical approach. While doing this, they 
accept the critiques approach as true. This would mean that the meaning 
lies within the objects – a position, which Kant (Kant 1999) rejected. 
None of the positions notice the reference to the world due to 
language. The critiques as well as the defenders refer to the world in 
language. By sharing a certain set of words, every human being has its own 
criteria for the classification of the sensual perception. By talking about the 
Big Bang and God’s creation, both are talking about the origin of the 
world. Having this in mind, Wittgenstein’s approach of playing a language-
game enacts a part. (Wittgenstein 1973; Wittgenstein 1972) 
According to Wittgenstein, playing a language-game means to 
follow certain rules of grammar. Using the rules in a right way, leads to the 
right action, i.e. other persons interact with one. Thus, meaning develops 
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within a reference system and among the people who play that language-
game.  
It is the thesis of my paper that Wittgenstein uses the example of 
the religious language-game for describing that every language-game 
grounds on an inexplainable foundation like the faith in God. The 
impossibility of explaining God is quite similar to the inexplainability of 
the Big Bang. Instead, God can be described as well as the Big Bang. 
Playing a language-game means to trust in a certain foundation 
with certainty, but not necessarily with God. Playing a language-game then 
is based on faith, but without revelation. 
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Arthur Prior (1914-1969) is usually considered the founding father of 
modern temporal logic, his main contribution being the formal logic of 
tenses (Øhrstrøm and Hasle, 2006). In his memorial paper on Prior, A.J.P. 
Kenny summed up Prior's life and work as follows. 
 Prior's greatest scholarly achievement was undoubtedly the 
creation and development of tense-logic. But his research and reflection on 
this topic led him to elaborate, piece by piece, a whole metaphysical system 
of an individual and characteristic stamp. He had many different interests 
at different periods of his life, but from different angles he constantly 
returned to the same central and unchanging themes. Throughout his life, 
for instance, he worked away at the knot of problems surrounding 
determinism: first as a predestinarian theologian, then as a moral 
philosopher, finally as a metaphysician and logician. (Braüner, 2013) p. 
11. 
In my talk I will describe how Prior's theological and philosophical 
reflections were the basis for what he called four grades of tense-logical 
involvement, which gave rise to what nowadays is called hybrid modal 
logic (Braüner, 2013). Prior was a strong adherent of what the philosopher 
McTaggart called the A-series conception of time, also called the dynamic 
view, according to which the past, present, and future tenses are primitive 
concepts from which other temporal concepts, in particular instants and the 
earlier-later relation, are to be derived. This is in contrast to the B-series 
conception, also called the static view, according to which instants and the 
earlier-later relation are primitive. The A-series conception embodies the 
local way in which human beings experience the flow of time whereas the 
B-series conception embodies a tapestry view of time, where time is a 
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sequence of objectively and tenselessly existing instants. Prior argued that 
God does not see time as a tapestry, but experience time as passing. This is 
for example the case in (Hasle et al., 2003) Chapter IV, where he gives 
various translations of the statement 'God is omniscient', one being 'For 
every p, if p then God knows that p', and discusses whether the verb 
'knows' is to be understood as a verb in present tense, or not.  
Many very reputable philosophers, e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas, have 
held that God's knowledge is in some way right outside time, in which case 
presumably the verb 'knows' in our translation would have to be thought of 
as tenseless. I want to argue against this view, on the ground that its final 
effect is to restrict what God knows to those truths, if any, which are 
themselves timeless. For example, God could not, on the view I am 
considering, know that the 1960 final examinations at Manchester are now 
over, for it isn't something that He or anyone could know timelessly, 
because it just isn't true timelessly. (Hasle et al., 2003) p. 42. 
Motivated by his preference for the A-series conception of time, 
Prior had as a goal to extend tense logic (that is, A-logic) such that it could 
be considered as encompassing first-order earlier-later logic (B-logic). To 
this end he introduced the four grades of tense-logical involvement, (Hasle 
et al., 2003) Chapter XI. The stages progress from pure first-order earlier-
later logic to what can be regarded as a pure tense logic, where the second 
grade is a “neutral” logic encompassing first-order earlier-later logic and 
tense logic on the same footing, and where the third grade is a version of 
what nowadays is called hybrid tense logic, obtained by extending ordinary 
tense logic with further expressive power. 
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The thesis is: The concept of quantum information introduced by quantum 
mechanics allows of an interpretation of the world as conscious, and of 
logic as the result of the action of that conscious medium. 
As usual, quantum mechanics and the theory of quantum 
information call that interpretation “quantum computer” or “the universe 
(world) as a quantum computer”. However, one can show that this 
“quantum computer” possesses the capability of free choice and some kind 
of natural teleology. The link between the former and latter generates one 
phenomenon, which can be investigated by science: It can be called the free 
will of the universe and interpreted as a scientific conception of God or as a 
hypostasis of Him studied by theology.  
The same viewpoint includes all logics or the conception of 
universal logic in a natural way. Any logic “of anything” can be seen as a 
partial ordering and thus as a stage of the universal and single well-ordering 
of the universe going to the past and accomplished by the “universe as a 
quantum computer”. Thus, any that should be a partial result in the ordering 
in the course of time from future to past by the meditation of the present 
and of the choices made in the present.  
Arguments:  
(I) Course of time can be described in terms of quantum mechanics 
as follows: The absolutely coherent state of the future de-coheres gradually 
into less and less entangled quantum systems by means of choices (or 
“measurements”) made in the present. Thus, those entangled quantum 
systems are being transformed in mechanical systems absolutely separated 
to each other in and after the limit from the present to the past.   
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(II) Universal logic can be considered as the series of partial 
orderings of some universal class, e.g. that of all sets. Then, any given logic 
will be exactly one member of that series and can be defined (1) by the set, 
to which the partial orderings refer, and (2) by the rule, which can generate 
just the partial ordering, i.e. by the property, which describes the set of all 
well-orderings representing the partial ordering in question. The definition 
(1) determines the logic as the “logic of something” where that 
“something” is the set, which has to be ordered and its “logic” means the 
way and degree of the ordering. The definition (1) includes both (1.1) any 
scientific theory as the logic of the object of the theory, and properly (1.2) 
the “logics of something” where that “something” is some set more 
interesting by the rule (2), which can generate rather than by itself. The 
definition (2) includes both (2.1) the case of the explicit property 
generating (all) well-orderings on any set independently of the 
interpretation of its elements and (2.2) the “topological representation” of 
the logic as the description of all well-orderings one by one rather than a 
common property determining unambiguously all well-orderings as it is in 
the former case. 
(III) The collaboration of quantum mechanics by the conception of 
quantum information allows of a natural ontological interpretation of 
universal logic. There is a natural process of ordering in the course of time 
independent of what is ordered. What is ordered can be e.g. the world, i.e. 
the universe as a whole, or any part of it, i.e. any quantum system. So, 
universal logic can be interpreted as the successive partial results in the 
process of ordering independent of what is ordered. That ordering is a well-
ordering and it originates from the course of time. According to quantum 
mechanics, the general course of time can be described as a (well-) ordering 
in thus: The coherent state of future is being ordered into the single well-
ordering of the past here by the meditation of the all choices in the present 
accomplishing the ordering. That universal well-ordering in turn orders 
well all partial results, each of which is some logic. Consequently, the 
series of all logics turns out to be well-ordered if that is the conception of 
universal logic. The distance between any two logics can be measured by 
the quantity of (quantum) information. Any logic is unambiguously 
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determined by the information distance from the coherent state (the 
“absolute future”), on the one hand, and from the single well-ordering (the 
“absolute past”), on the other hand. 
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One of the problems that bring together questions related to both logic and 
religion is the problem of compatibilism, i.e. the question whether it is 
consistent to maintain that human beings have free will in a deterministic 
world (or, expressed in a more condensed form, whether free will is 
compatible with determinism). 
The relation of this problem to religion is obvious. One of the most 
widespread responses to the question how it is possible that people created 
by God are capable of evil deeds is that we are equipped with free will. 
However, the idea that free will is compatible with determinism raises 
doubts whether this response is a sufficient reply to the worry. On the other 
hand, some forms of compatibilism could clarify how God can be 
omniscient (in particular about future human actions), even if we suppose 
that we have free will. 
The problem of compatibilism is also relevant to logic (in a broad 
sense of the word).  First of all, it is a problem of consistency, a problem 
whether two statements (“human beings have free will” and “the world is 
deterministic”) are compatible, and problems of this kind are logical 
problems and should, in principle, be decidable on the level of conceptual 
analysis and logic even without determining what the truth values of the 
statements in question are. Moreover, as the famous debate between 
(Moore, 1912) and (Austin, 1961) illustrates, the problem is closely related 
to a central topic in the area of philosophical logic: logical analysis of 
conditional sentences. 
In my talk, I will concentrate on this logical aspect of the problem 
of compatibilism and free will. I will defend a version of compatibilism 
which is inspired by Moore (1912) and which is based on the idea that the 
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statement “I could have acted differently than I actually did”, meant as 
evidence in support of the claim that I have free will, is not incompatible 
with the statement  “I could not have acted differently than I actually did”, 
meant as evidence in support of determinism, since the word “could” has 
different meanings in these two statements. In contrast with the second 
statement, the first claim is a hidden subjunctive (counterfactual) 
conditional equivalent to “if I had decided to act differently than I actually 
did, I would have acted differently than I actually did” which says nothing 
else than that my action was (causally) determined by my will. To clarify 
this point, I will apply standard semantics of counterfactuals in the style of 
(Lewis, 1973) and (Stalnaker, 1968). 
Every attempt to defend that free will is compatible with 
determinism should be accompanied with an explanation why people have 
such a strong inclination to think the opposite. One of the aims of my talk 
will be to formulate an explanation of this phenomenon using the apparatus 
of modern logic. I will also briefly compare the proposed position with 
some well-known versions of compatibilism such as those formulated in 
(Hume, 1777), (Ayer, 1954), or (Dennett, 2003). 
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In this paper I continue discussing the below picture investigated in 
(Schang, 2014). I submit another interpretation of the picture. In my 
interpretation the picture contains not a logic inconsistency but an illusion 
of it as the word “is” is used in two different meanings.  In all the three “Is-
Not”s (indicated by red color) the word “Is” stands for the well-known 
logic connective. But in all the rest three cases (indicated by green color) 
the word “Is” stands for the “formal-ethical-equivalence” relation defined 
precisely in two-valued algebra of formal ethics (Lobovikov, 2014). The 
mentioned formal-ethical-equivalence and the formal-logical one are 
logically different relations of equivalence although in natural language 
they are represented by one and the same word-homonym “is”. Hence in 
the below picture they do not make up a logic contradiction. “The Father”, 
“the Son”, “the Holy Spirit”, “God” are precisely defined as moral-
evaluation-functions. In two-valued algebra of formal ethics by means of 
the definitions it is easy to figure out the formal-ethical equations 
demonstrating the Unity of the Trinity. The inconsistency illusion in 
question is eliminated by virtue of “Hume’s Guillotine” generalized and 
precisely formulated within the algebraic system of formal ethics 
(Lobovikov, 2014). 
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It is generally regarded as a matter of course that from statements other 
statements are inferable. People making statements are normally taken as 
accountable for the implications of what they said. The fact that logic 
provides methods allowing to demonstrate that statements have certain 
consequences is of utmost importance for resolving disputes - if somebody 
makes a statement whose consequences are manifestly false or even 
contradictory, they can be (providing that they are reasonable individuals) 
convinced to give up the statement. Can similar rational disputes arise in 
case of commandments or prayers? 
  The question whether commands or prayers have any logical 
consequences is controversial. Those who admit that they do, implicitly 
include this specific part of religious discourse into the domain where a 
rational discussion can take place. In such case it should be possible to 
demonstrate that certain commands are (given certain situation) incoherent 
or ill-conceived, or that a certain prayer contradicts another prayer.   
  The problem of ‘logicality’ of the non-descriptive language is clearly 
formulated in the so called Jörgensen’s dilemma. Those who resolve the 
dilemma in the ‘optimistic’ way pave a way to formulation of logical 
systems that are known as the logic of imperatives, the logic of commands, 
the logic of norms or subsumed under the general heading deontic logic. In 
my paper I will argue that construction of logical theories of this kind is a 
legitimate project which, however, evokes number of foundational 
questions that are scarcely properly addressed. 
  In the first part of my paper I will focus on one of the questions, 
namely the question which semantic value (if any) is transmitted in a 
correct inference involving prescriptions. I will try to show that it is natural 
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to ascribe to individual sentences suitable for formulation of commands and 
prayers (or the ‘propositions’ they express) a value which might be called 
the appeal force. They do not acquire the value absolutely but only with 
respect to a given framework which is typically established by an ordered 
pair of subjects: authority (supplicant) whose activity constitutes the 
specific ‘demandatory relation’, and the addressee. Consequently the 
sentences (‘propositions’) that are in force may be ascribed another value 
which may be called satisfaction value. Thus we get the following scheme: 
 
 
 
 
         I will argue that logico-semantic theories of prescriptive discourse 
should take into account both the values. Though I will claim that there is 
no substantial difference between the logic of command(ment)s and the 
logic of prayers, I will suggest that commandments issued by a divine 
(infallible) authority have a special sort of implications - they (unlike 
prayers) allow for extracting the factual presuppositions of the 
prescriptions. Thus, for example, the commandment “Observe the sabbath 
day, to keep it holy!” implies the conclusion “There is a sabbath day”. Thus 
in this case the so-called Hare’s thesis doesn’t hold. In the rest of the paper 
I will address some particular problems that concern the logical analysis of 
selected commandments from the Decalogue and of certain parts of 
common prayers. 
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The core idea of the »ontological« proof is to show that the concept or idea 
of existence is somehow contained in the concept of God, and that 
therefore the existence of God can be logically derived – without any 
further assumptions about the external world – from Its very idea or 
definition. In this connection, two main definitions are considered: God as 
the most perfect being (“ens perfectissimum”), or God as the necessary 
being (“ens necessarium”). Now G.W. Leibniz has argued that the 
traditional versions of the »ontological« proof are not fully conclusive 
because they rest on the tacit assumption that the definition or conception 
of God is possible, i.e. free from contradiction. A complete proof will rather 
have to consist of two parts. First, a demonstration of the premise 
THEO 1:  God is possible. 
Second, a proof of the „propositio memorabilis“ 
THEO 2:  If God is possible, then God exists. 
Depending on the respective definition, these propositions maintain more 
exactly: 
THEO 1a:  The most perfect being is possible 
THEO 2a:  If the most perfect being is possible, then it exists; 
or: 
THEO 1b: The necessary being is possible 
THEO 2b: If the necessary being is possible, then it exists. 
In this contribution an interesting manuscript will be examined in 
which Leibniz tries to prove THEO 2b. It will be argued that the underlying 
idea of God as “ens necessarium” has to be interpreted with the help of a 
distinguished predicate letter ‘E’ (denoting the concept of existence) as  
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DEF 1: g := xE(x). 
Principle THEO 2b (which Leibniz considered as „the best fruit of 
the entire logic”) can then be formalized as follows 
(*) E(xE(x))  E(xE(x)). 
At first sight, Leibniz’s proof of (*) seems to be absolutely correct, 
but a closer examination reveals an ambiguity in his use of the modal 
notions. According to DEF 1, the necessity of the “Ens necessarium” has to 
be understood in the sense of something, x, which necessarily exists, E(x). 
However, in other passages of his proof of (*), Leibniz interprets the 
assumption that the “Ens necessarium” is impossible in the diverging sense 
of something, y, which involves a contradiction. Furthermore, Leibniz 
believes that an »impossible thing«, y, is such that contradictory 
propositions like F(y) and F(y) might both be true of y. 
It will be argued that the latter assumption is incompatible with 
Leibniz’s general views about logic and that the crucial proof is better 
reinterpreted as dealing with the necessity, possibility, and impossibility of 
concepts rather than of objects. In this case, THEO 2b turns out to be a 
theorem of Leibniz’s second order logic of concepts, but in order to obtain 
a full demonstration of the existence of God, THEO 1a, i.e. the logical self-
consistency of the concept of a necessary being, remains to be shown. As 
Leibniz himself remarked,  
“[...] as long as this possibility is not proved, one may not believe 
to have demonstrated the existence of God by means of this 
argument. For it has to be observed quite generally that from a 
definition nothing certain can be derived concerning the defined 
entity unless it is clear that the definition expresses something 
possible. For if the definition implies a hidden contradiction then 
something absurd may be derived from it.” 
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A famous philosopher and theologian Maximus the Confessor takes a 
special place in forming a medieval philosophy. Assimilation of important 
ideas of Platonism and Aristotle, original composition of his own system 
make a special place for the doctrine of Maximus the Confessor as of a 
founder of a medieval philosophy.  
In the Middle Ages game resources are used in a form of 
philosophical texts, first of all: one can mention genres of a dialogue 
inherited from ancient philosophy as well as a genre of consolation which 
was made and became popular in the philosophy of the Early and High 
Middle Ages. The notion of a game and related notions also appear when 
thinkers of this age try to understand peculiarities of the being of the God 
and man as well as a correlation between reason and belief.  
From the very beginning when a medieval philosophy began to 
take shape ludological aspects of Platonic and Aristotle heritage are 
perceived by thinkers of a new historic cultural age and gradually become 
important elements of ontologic, gnoseologic and existential theories in a 
medieval philosophy. 
An individual cognitive act of an individuum was considered as a 
form of the coming of a subject with little individual being to the world of a 
general tragic game where he should have gone up from sensually defined 
being forms to the being of over-sensual beauty, which is defined only 
through forms of reason cognition, and through it to the over-essential 
being of its Creator. Maximus the Confessor gives a possibility to interpret 
the cosmos as a piece of art and the act of the creation of the world as an 
artistic creative act (Aristotle fully identifies the creation of the cosmos 
with a game).   
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